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Austerity, the European Council, and the
Institutional Future of the European Union: A
Proposal to Strengthen the Presidency of the
European Council
FEDERICO FABBRINI*
ABSTRACT

This article contextualizes the resilience of austerity in Europe,
explaining it in light of the transformations in the EU system of
governance. As the article maintains, since the eruption of the Eurocrisis, the European Council-the body congressing the heads of state
and government of the EU member states together with its Presidentand
the Presidentof the European Commission-has risen to the center of EU
governance. In an intergovernmental institution such as the European
Council, however, larger and wealthier states have been able to impose
their preferences on other states-a development that is at odds with the
anti-hegemonic nature of the EU integration project. To address this
problematic state of affairs, this article proposes a targeted institutional
reform: strengthening the President of the European Council. As this
article claims, a President of the European Council endowed with its
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own executive powers and legitimated by a popularelection could restore
a balance between the member states and, at the same time, create a
forum for democratic contestation of the policies of the European Union.
The proposal to strengthen the presidency of the European Council
builds on recent calls to redefine this institution as the presidency of the
European Union as a whole. However, it faces several challenges. This
article considers the following questions: 1) What are the advantages
associated with the proposal to strengthen the European Council
presidency and what powers should be attributed to the office?; 2) What
electoral mechanism could be conceived to select the President in an
asymmetrical Union of states and citizens?; and 3) What are the
incentives-and is there a window of opportunity-to implement this
reform? This article proposes ways to address these issues, opening a
debate on a potentially fruitful constitutional reform of the EU system of
governance.
INTRODUCTION
The causes of the recent economic and financial crisis, and the best
way to respond to it, are at the heart of heated debates in both the
United States and the European Union. While economists have clashed
on topics such as austerity, debt, and the role of central banks,' the
latest proof of the fundamental disagreement between policy makers
was prominently on display at the meetings of the Group of 20 (G20)
and International Monetary Fund (IMF) in fall 2014. Here, U.S.
officials-supported by representatives of EU countries such as France
and Italy-pushed for expansionary economic and monetary policies to
tackle the risk of global stagnation, but were rebuffed by Germany and
the United Kingdom, which advanced instead an economic blueprint
2
based on budget cuts and structural reforms as a way out of the crisis.

1. In the United States, compare CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS
TIME IS DIFFERENT: EIGHT CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY (2009) (arguing that higher

levels of public debt are responsible for economic contraction), with PAUL KRUGMAN, END
THIS DEPRESSION Now! (2012) (defending a Keynesian view, which advocates public
spending to boost growth and criticizes austerity). In the EU context, compare HANSWERNER SINN, THE EuRO TRAP (2014) (criticizing expansionary policies by the European
Central Bank, hailing structural reforms and making the case for the exit of some member
states from the Eurozone), with MARTIN WOLF, THE SHIFTS AND THE SHOCKS (2014)
(defending expansionary monetary policy).
2. See generally Mike Peacock, Austerity Versus Growth Version 3.0 at G20/IMF,
REUTERS (Oct. 5, 2014, 6:23 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/05/us-globaleconomy-idUSKCNOHU06E20141005 (discussing the debate in the context of the G20
between those favoring austerity measures and those favoring policies intended to foster
economic growth).
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Other contributions to this symposium on "Law and the Globalization of
Austerity" discuss the economic and political arguments pro or against
austerity, both nationally and globally. This article will not address
those issues. Rather, this article focuses on constitutional questions that
are raised by the policy of austerity, and which specifically concern the
institutional set up of the European Economic and Monetary Union

(EMU).
This article seeks to contextualize the European focus on the policy
of austerity within a broader discussion of how the institutional
framework of the European Union has evolved during the Euro-crisis,
shifting power among the EU member states, as well as among the EU
institutions. As this article explains, the resilience of austerity in the
European Union's responses to the crisis results from growing power
imbalances among EU member states and reflects Germany's increasing
centrality in the EU policy-making process. Austerity closely matched
long-standing and short-term economic preferences of Germany-the
largest and wealthiest EU Member State. Despite the increasing
protests against and opposition to austerity in many EU member states,
Germany has been able to entrench this economic strategy in EU law
and policy. Nevertheless, the shift of power among the EU member
states reflected by the policy of austerity reveals a deeper institutional
evolution in the architecture of the European Union. Accelerating
developments that were already embedded in the EU Maastricht Treaty
of 1992, the Euro-crisis has brought to the forefront the European
Council-the EU body that congresses the heads of states and
governments of the EU member states, together with its President and
the President of the European Commission. 3 During recent years, the
European Council has emerged as the center of EU policy making in the
economic domain and has displaced the other EU institutions as the
agenda setter on how to respond to the crisis.
Yet, as this article maintains, the rise of an intergovernmental body
such as the European Council has weakened the traditional checks and
balances that characterized the functioning of the European Union. In
particular, the management of the Euro-crisis by the European Council
3. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 15(2), Oct. 26,
2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 1 [hereinafter TEU]. Readers who are not experts in EU law
should pay attention to the fact that the European Council should not be confused with
the Council of the EU (or simply: the Council). While the former is an executive body
composed of prime ministers and heads of state (plus its own President and the President
of the European Commission), the latter is an institution exercising mainly legislative
power (as well as, however, administrative powers) and which brings together national
ministers, in various compositions, depending on the subject matter which is being
deliberated (e.g., agriculture, foreign affairs, etc.). See id. art. 16 (defining the role and
composition of the Council).
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has brought to light a dynamic of interstate domination since, in an
intergovernmental framework, state powers matter and thus stronger
states have greater influence over decisions. As this article claims, this
dynamic strikes at the heart of the project of EU integration. Regardless
of the specific substantive choices reflected by the policy of austerity, a
regime in which some states are structurally dominating the policymaking process undermines the anti-hegemonic ideal on which the
European Union was built, and generates decisions that are perceived
as illegitimate by those states and citizens that have no way to influence
the outcome of the policy-making process. Beyond the specific problem
that the resilience of austerity in the European Union poses, the new
allocation of powers among the EU institutions, and among the EU
member states, has brought to light a structural constitutional problem
in the European Union. Addressing this problem constitutes an urgent
need to ensure the enduring sustainability of the European Union.
In order to address this problem, this article proposes an
institutional reform and makes the case in favor of strengthening the
role of the President of the European Council. If the European Council
has become the central institution in deciding the economic policy of the
European Union, efforts should be made to prevent this institution from
being captured by specific state preferences, and the role of the
presidency should be explored to this end. While under the current
constitutional set up the President of the European Council only enjoys
limited authority, this office should be reformed and endowed with
greater executive powers of its own, including the task to set the policy
agenda of the European Union. At the same time, these greater powers
should be counterbalanced by a new democratic mechanism for electing
the President that entrusts the office with the legitimacy to act in the
name of the European Union as a whole. Compared to other recent
options of institutional reform, including the efforts to politicize the
President of the European Commission by transforming the European
Union into a parliamentary regime, the proposal to strengthen the
President of the European Council along a constitutional logic of
separation of powers is better suited to keep in check the larger member
states within the European Council. A stronger, directly legitimated
presidency would prevent the dynamics of domination that the crisis
brought to the fore and, at the same time, could create a genuine forum
for democratic competition and contestation of the EU agenda.
The proposal to strengthen the presidency of the European Council
revives ideas already advanced during the European Constitutional
Convention of 2002-2003. 4 At the same time, the proposal is

4. See infra p. 300.
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emboldened by the recent calls to redefine the role of the President of
the European Council as the President of the European Union as a
whole.5 Nevertheless, I am mindful of the difficulties that any such
program of institutional change would meet in today's European Union.
As such, this article also considers three challenges that would arise
along the road toward strengthening the presidency of the European
Council. First, there exists a challenge of representation connected to
the difficulties of providing an electoral forum in which presidential
candidates can represent, and thus frame, alternative visions for the
governance of the European Union. Second, there is a challenge of
asymmetry related to the need to design a system for electing the
President of the European Council that is able to account for, and yet
balance, the asymmetrical size of the EU member states' populations.
Third, there is a challenge of unanimity related to the difficulty of
introducing the reform proposed in this article in the current EU
system, given the need to obtain the unanimous agreement of all
member states. This article considers each of those difficult challenges.
It accepts that none of them has an easy solution. Yet, this article
submits that it is time for a serious discussion about how the EU system
of governance should be reformed to improve its effectiveness and
legitimacy.
The resilience of austerity in Europe is just the surface of a
structural, tectonic shift in the architecture of the European Union. The
European Council has emerged as the main EU institution in charge of
defining the policy agenda of the European Union. Yet, the rise of the
European Council has not been an unproblematic development. In a
framework of intergovernmental governance, some states have been
able to dominate the policy-making process, challenging at its core the
anti-hegemonic nature of the European integration project. Regardless
of whether one agrees with the policy of austerity promoted by the
European Council to address the crisis, an institutional regime in which
interstate relations are increasingly unbalanced threatens to undermine
the sustainability of the European Union. A necessary step to address
this problem is a constitutional reform of the EU architecture. The
proposal to strengthen the power and legitimacy of the President of the
European Council along the constitutional logic of separation of powers
may be the best option to redress the problem of interstate domination,
and to create a genuine space for democratic contestation on the agenda
of the European Union.
This article is structured as follows. Part I explains the resilience of
austerity in the European Union's responses to the Euro-crisis in light
5. See infra p. 299.
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of the growing imbalance between the member states and the central
position that Germany has come to play in the EU decision-making
process as far as economic policy is concerned. Part II zooms back and
clarifies how austerity is just the evidence of a broader institutional
transformation in the EU architecture, which has seen the European
Council rise to the center of EU policy making. Part III argues that the
current EU institutional setup has produced a problematic dynamic of
interstate domination that challenges at its heart the nature of the
European Union. To address that situation, therefore, I make the case
in favor of strengthening the presidency of the European Council and
argue that this reform could reestablish a balance between the member
states and secure a forum for democratic contestation on the EU
agenda. Subsequent sections then develop this proposal and discuss
specific challenges. Hence, Part IV considers how an effective and
legitimated President of the European Council could solve the EU
representation deficit and defines which new powers should be
attributed to the office. Part V dwells on the mechanics of the election of
the President of the European Council in light of the profound
asymmetry in the population of the EU member states. Part VI
considers whether the proposal to strengthen the presidency of the
European Council could win the unanimous consensus needed for treaty
change, suggesting that the reform of the EMU provides a window of
opportunity, and advancing pragmatic and institutional arguments to
have all the member states sign off on the proposal. A brief conclusion
follows.
I.

INTERSTATE RELATIONS AND THE RESILIENCE OF EUROPEAN AUSTERITY

Scholars and analysts have emphasized that austerity has been the
6
main economic blueprint followed in Europe to address the crisis.
Although the causes of the Euro-crisis are contested, the main narrative
that has prevailed in the European Union since 2009 blames the
deterioration of the European economy on the irresponsible fiscal
behavior of several member states. Of course, as Miguel Maduro has
argued, 7 another plausible narrative of the crisis could have put the

6. See, e.g., JEAN PISANI-FERRY, THE EuRo CRISIS AND ITS AFTERMATH (Cristophe
Gouardo trans., 2014); Benjamin M. Friedman, The Pathology of Europe's Debt, 61 N.Y.
REV. BOOKS, Oct. 9, 2014, at 50.
7. See Miguel Poiares Maduro, A New Governance for the European Union and the
Euro: Democracy and Justice, report commissioned by the Constitutional Affairs
Committee of the European Parliament PE 462.484 (Sept. 2012) (contrasting a narrative
of the crisis based on excessive spending by some states with one based on irresponsible
lending by some banks).
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blame on the banking sector and its irresponsible lending to debtors
who lacked sufficient creditworthiness. Nevertheless, the EU
institutions and the member states unequivocally responded to the
crisis as if this were purely a problem of sovereign debt. 8 As a result,
austerity-or fiscal consolidation, the idea that national governments
must slash deficits and restructure public expenditures as a way to
restore a sustainable path towards economic expansion-has become
the official credo in responding to the crisis. 9 In fact, legal reforms of the
EMU have largely codified this view: 10 As Paul Craig has explained,
new EMU rules have compelled member states to constitutionalize a
the oversight of
balanced budget amendment, strengthened
processes
of the member
over
the
budgetary
authorities
supranational
states, and imposed tough programs of economic adjustment on
countries on the brink of default that were recipients of financial
support." 1
Extensive literature discusses the design and implementation of
austerity policy in the European Union following the Euro-crisis. Some
observers have underlined a positive side to the story-particularly in
promoting structural reforms in countries like Italy, where the economy
was traditionally overburdened by a gigantic public sector and by strong
political resistance to reform. 12 Nevertheless, many others have
emphasized the negative effects that austerity measures produced on
the welfare state, especially in countries such as Greece, Portugal, or

8. See Jan Windebank & Adam Whitworth, Social Welfare and the Ethics of Austerity
in Europe: Justice, Ideology and Equality, 22 J. CONTEMP. EUR. STUD. 99, 99 (2014);
Editorial, Europe's Recurring Malaise, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2014, at A18, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/18/opinion/europes-recurring-malaise.html?_r=O.
9. See generally Alberto Alesina & Silvia Ardagna, Tales of Fiscal Adjustments, 27
ECON. POLY 489 (1998), for an articulated academic explanation of the so-called theory of
expansionary austerity. As reported by Peter Coy, Professor Alesina gave a presentation of
an updated version of his paper to the Ministers of Finance of the EU member states at
their meeting in Madrid on April 17, 2010. See Peter Coy, Keynes vs Alesina. Alesina
Who?, BLOOMBERG BUS. (June 29, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/stories/2010-0629/keynes-vs-dot-alesina-dot-alesina-who.
10. See Federico Fabbrini, The Fiscal Compact, the "Golden Rule," and the Paradox of
EuropeanFederalism, 36 B.C. IN'L & COMP. L. REV. 1 (2013).
11. See Paul Craig, Economic Governance and the Euro Crisis: Constitutional
Architecture and Constitutional Implications, in THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF
EUROPEAN BUDGETARY CONSTRAINTS 19, 21-22 (Maurice Adams, Federico Fabbrini &
Pierre Larouche eds., 2014).
12. See, e.g., Vincenzo Visco, Governor It. Cent. Bank, Considerazioni Finali, Speech at
the Banca d'Italia (May 30, 2014), available at https://www.bancaditalia.it/
pubblicazioni/interventi-governatore/integov20l4/cfl3_considerazioni-fiali.pdf
(emphasizing opportunities created by the crisis for reforms).
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Spain, where unemployment soared to unprecedented levels. 13 Be that
as it may, during the last years, the policy of austerity has increasingly
come under attack. Massive street demonstrations and national strikes
against austerity policy were organized in Athens and Madrid. 14 New
national governments were elected on anti-austerity platforms in Paris
and Rome.' 5 And growing emphasis on the need for growth policies was
voiced in Brussels 16 as well as in Washington.17 These events have
certainly signaled increasing political discontent with the European
strategy for tackling the crisis' 8 and have raised awareness about the
dire problem of youth unemployment. 19 Nevertheless, they have not
fundamentally changed the status quo, with austerity remaining the
default economic policy of the European Union. Why is that so?
To explain the resilience of austerity policy in the European Union
notwithstanding the growing discontent and opposition against it, we
need to understand the changing relationship among the EU member
states since the crisis. As I have explained elsewhere, 20 the Euro-crisis
and the political and legal responses to it have produced important
constitutional implications for the horizontal relations of powers among
the EU member states. Whereas the EU institutional system had
13. See, e.g., KLAUS BUCH ET AL., EuRo CRISIS, AUSTERITY POLICY AND THE EUROPEAN
SOCIAL MODEL: How CRISIS IN SOUTHERN EUROPE THREATENS THE EU'S SOCIAL
DIMENSION (2013) (discussing the restrictions that austerity policies produce on the
welfare state).
14. See Graeme Wearden, Europe's Day of Anti-Austerity Strikes and Protests Turn
Violent, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 14, 2012, 12:31 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/business/
2012/nov/14/eurozone-crisis-general-strikes-protest-day-of-action
(reporting
massive
strikes in cities across Europe and episodes of violence).
15. See Andrew Higgins, Europe Pressed to Reconsider Cuts as a Cure, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 27, 2013, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/27/world/europe/eu-ispressed-to-reconsider-cuts-as-economic-cure.html?pagewanted=all&_r=O
(discussing
increased political malaise vis-A-vis the policy of austerity so far adopted to address the
Euro-crisis).
16. See, e.g., European Parliament Resolution on the Enquiry on the Role and
Operations of the Troika (ECB, Commission, and IMF) with Regard to the Euro Area
Programme Countries, PARL. EUR. Doc. P7_TA(2014)0239 (2014) (criticizing the policy
promoted by the troika in the EU member states subject to economic adjustment
programs).
17. See generally Int'l Monetary Fund [IMF], Toward a Fiscal Union for the Euro Area,
SDN/13/09 (Sept. 2013) (suggesting the need to develop a fiscal capacity at the EU level to
boost growth).
18. See Federico Fabbrini, The Euro-Crisis and the Courts: Judicial Review and the
PoliticalProcess in Comparative Perspective, 32 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 64, 117-18 (2014).
19. See European Council Conclusions EUCO 104/2/13 of 28 June 2013, at 1 (launching
an initiative to fight youth unemployment).
20. See Federico Fabbrini, States' Equality v States' Power: The Euro-crisis,Inter-state
Relations and the Paradox of Domination, 17 CAMBRIDGE Y.B. EUR. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1
(2015).
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originally been designed to strike a delicate balance between states'
power and states' equality, the Euro-crisis and the responses to it have
increasingly upset this balance, empowering bigger, economically
stronger member states to the detriment of smaller, economically
weaker ones. Legal reforms in salient areas such as economic
assistance, financial stabilization, and banking resolution have formally
entrenched the asymmetry of power between the member states,
recognizing special privileges for some of them and enshrining into law
their preferred economic policy. 2 1 Moreover, as both lawyers and
political scientists have emphasized, a growing imbalance between the
member states has also emerged in the European Union's decision22
making process.
In particular, the European Council has emerged as the "new centre
of EU politics," 23 as far as economic policy is concerned. 24 Within this
intergovernmental body, however, larger member states have been able
to play a dominant role at the expense of the other members. As Jonas
Tallberg has emphasized, bargaining in the European Council is the
result of several sources of power: state sources of power, institutional
sources of power, and personal sources of power. 25 Although, formally
speaking, all heads of state or government enjoy equal status in the
European Council-every state having one representative that can
authoritatively represent the view of its country-in reality "differences
between large and small Member states" shape power relations in the
European Council. 26 Aggregate state sources of power play the most
fundamental role in explaining negotiation in the European Council,
with the result that larger member states can dominate the process. 27 In

21. See id.
22. See generally Mark Dawson & Floris de Witte, ConstitutionalBalance in the EU
after the Euro-Crisis, 76 MOD. L. REV. 817 (2013) (analyzing reforms undermining the
constitutional balance and affecting stability in the EU context); Georgios Maris &
Pantelis Sklias, Intergovernmentalism and the New Framework of EMU Governance, in
WHAT FORM OF GOVERNMENT FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE EUROZONE? 57 (Federico
Fabbrini et al. eds., 2015).
23. Uwe Puetter, The European Council-the New Centre of EU Politics, 16 SWED.
INST. EUR. POL'Y, EUR. POL'Y ANALYSIS 1 (2013).
24. See infra Part II.
25. Jonas Tallberg, Bargaining Power in the European Council, 46 J. COMMON MKT.
STUD. 685, 687 (2008).
26. Id.
27. In another intergovernmental context, that of the Eurogroup-which brings
together the finance ministers of the Eurozone member states, under the chairmanship of
a semi-permanent presidency-the former President of the Eurogroup Jean-Claude
Juncker famously decided to step down from the job complaining that it was impossible for
him to make decisions because of the way Germany and France were running the show.
See Patrick Henry & Brian Parkin, Juncker Says Ceding Euro Job Due to Franco-German
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this context, it is not surprising that Germany has come to play a
hegemonic role in defining the economic agenda of the European
Union. 28 Since reunification, Germany has been the most populous EU
member state. 29 At the same time, thanks to the major economic
reforms the center-left Schr6der Government undertaken between 1998
and 2005, Germany found itself in the healthiest economic condition of
30
any EU member state when the Euro-crisis erupted.
The policy of austerity that ensued in the European Union largely
tracked German preferences. 31 On one hand, promotion of austerity at
the EU level reflected the export of long-term German economic ideas
across the European Union. 32 Christian Joerges has underlined how the
logic of austerity has strong roots in the ordoliberal theory that has
underpinned German economic policy since World War 11. 33 According to
this view-that has now been also constitutionalized in the Basic

Interference, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 30, 2012, 2:45 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2012-04-30/juncker-says-ceding-euro-job-due-to-franco-german-interference
(reporting Mr. Juncker as stating that Germany and France acted in the Eurogroup "as if
they are the only members of the group").
28. See William E. Paterson, The Reluctant Hegemon? Germany Moves Centre Stage in
the European Union, 49 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 57, 73 (2011).
29. See Population, EUROSTAT, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=
table&language=en&pcode=tps00001&tableSeection=l&footnotes=yes&abeinglabels&
plugin=l (last visited Aug. 7, 2014).
30. See Gerhard Schroder, Fed. C. Ger., Courage for Peace and Courage for Change,
Policy Statement at the German Bundestag (Mar. 14, 2003) (outlining the famous Agenda
2010); See also A Quick Guide To 'Agenda 2010" DEUTSCHE WELLE (Oct. 17, 2003),
http://www.dw.de/a-quick-guide-to-agenda-2010/a-988374-1, for an overview in English of
the measures adopted by the Schroder Government.
31. The argument advanced here should not be taken to mean that all German
economic preferences have been incorporated into EU economic policy. A good example is
the proposal for "contractual arrangements," which aimed to bind EU member states in
fragile economic conditions to a detailed program of structural reforms in exchange for
financial assistance by wealthier member states. Germany strongly pushed for this
proposal-and the European Commission followed up on it. See Communication from the
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council-The Introduction of a
Convergence and Competitiveness Instrument, COM(2013) 165 final (Mar. 20, 2013).
However, opposition by virtually every other EU member state made the proposal moot.
See Press Release, Gov't of the Neth., Contractual Arrangements with EU Member States
not Binding, says Rutte (Dec. 20, 2013), available at http://www.government.nlnews/
2013/12/2/contractual-arrangements-with-eu-member-states-not-binding-says-rutte.html
(reporting opinion of Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte against binding contractual
arrangements imposed by the EU).
32. See generally David J. Gerber, Constitutionalizing the Economy: German NeoLiberalism, Competition Law and the 'New"Europe, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 25 (1994).
33. See Christian Joerges, Europe's Economic Constitution in Crisis and the Emergence
of a New ConstitutionalConstellation, 15 GERM. L.J. 985, 989 (2014).
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LaW 4 -the government should run a sound fiscal policy, with a
balanced budget and a prohibition on contracting public debt. At the
same time, the German economy had been traditionally characterized as
export-oriented and based on the capacity of labor-management
relations to contain pressures for salary increases as a condition to boost
competitiveness. 3 5 Following the outbreak of the crisis, Germany
prescribed the ordoliberal receipt throughout the European Unionpromoting the constitutionalization of budgetary constraints in the EU
member states via the Fiscal Compact, 386 and advocating fiscal
consolidation and structural reforms as a way to increase
7
competitiveness and growth in the EurozoneA
On the other hand, the promotion of austerity to respond to the
Euro-crisis also represented the most apt strategy for Germany to
promote its contingent interests in the European Union. The design of
tough economic adjustment programs for countries receiving financial
assistance was, in fact, the best policy option to protect German banking
interests. 3 Despite the rhetoric to the contrary, the choice to bail out
EU member states in fiscal trouble, such as Greece, was an alternative
to sovereign default. 3 Article 125 of the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union (TFEU) enshrined a no-bail-out clause. 40 Yet the
Greek bail-out was the option that better protected the interests of
German (and French) banks, shielding them from financial losses, while
shifting the costs of the rescue to the assisted country. 41 Greece was
34. Gesetz zue Anderung des Grundgesetzes [Law Amending the Basic Law], July 29,
2009, BGBL. I S. at 2248 (Ger.).
35. See Germanys Economic Model: What Germany Offers the World, ECONOMIST, Apr.
14, 2012, http://www.economist.com/node/21552567.
36. See generally THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF EUROPEAN BUDGETARY
CONSTRAINTS (Federico Fabbrini et al. eds., 2014) (describing the constitutional
incorporation of the "golden rule" by the EU member states).
37. See, e.g., Angela Merkel, Fed. C. Ger., Government Statement Delivered by
Chancellor Angela Merkel on the EU's Eastern Partnership Summit (Nov. 18, 2013)
(calling EU member states to implement economic reforms).
38. See Helen Thompson, The Crisis of the Euro: The Problem of German Power
Revisited, SHEFFIELD POLITICAL ECON. RESEARCH INST. PAPER No. 8 (Univ. of Sheffield,
Sheffield, U.K.), Dec. 2013, at 7.
39. See MARK BLYTH, AUSTERITY: THE HISTORY OF A DANGEROUS IDEA 98 (2013)
(criticizing the justification of the responses to the crisis based on the argument that
'there is no alternative"').
40. See Jean-Victor Louis, Guest Editorial, The No-Bailout and Rescue Packages, 47
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 971, 976 (2010).
41. I do not have sufficient knowledge to judge whether Greek sovereign debt default
would have been a better option for Greece, although I am persuaded that it could have
been extremely dangerous for the Eurozone as such. See Lorenzo Bini Smaghi, Member of
the Exec. Bd. of the Eur. Cent. Bank, Speech on 'Monetary and Financial Stability in the
Euro Area" at the State of the Union Conference (May 10, 2011) (explaining that default
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subject to a tough program of economic adjustment as a condition for
receiving financial aid, which involved heavy cuts to the welfare state to
42
repay its loans-and the interest rates-to countries lending money.
Otherwise, it is worth remembering that, despite Germany's current
obsession with governments' deficit, Germany was the first EU member
state, together with France, to violate the deficit rule set in the EU
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)43 when doing so suited its economic
interest. 44 Promoting austerity in the European Union in response to
the Euro-crisis was therefore also a deliberate policy choice by the
German government.
Given Germany's centrality in setting EU economic policy, political
protest and electoral change in other EU member states have only
45
marginally altered the pro-austerity stance of the European Union. It
is true that other, smaller member states of Northern Europe-such as
Finland-endorsed a policy of austerity. 46 However, the ways in which
Germany led the decision-making process on austerity were perceived
as problematic even in this country, due to the increasing
marginalization of the national democratic arena. 47 At the same time,
or debt restructuring is a dramatic economic and social event for the country which
experiences it, which leads many into poverty).
42. See Xenophon Contiades & Ioannis A. Tassopoulos, The Impact of the Financial
Crisison the Greek Constitution,in CONSTITUTIONS IN THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 195
(Xenophon Contiades ed., 2013).
43. See generally, Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union-Protocol No.
12 on the Excessive Deficit Procedure, art. 1, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 279 (stating that member
states must run yearly deficits of below 3% of GDP and that they must have a public debt
of below 60% of GDP).
44. See Council Decision 2003/89/EC, on the existence of deficit in Germany 2003 O.J.
(L 34) 16 (holding sanctions against Germany in abeyance). But see, Case C-27/04,
Comm'n v. Council, 2004 E.C.R. 1-6649 (EU Court of Justice recognizing wide discretion to
the Council whether to impose sanctions under the SGP as recommended by the
Commission, or held in abeyance the excessive deficit procedure against Germany and
France).
45. See also ANDREW GLENCRoss, THE POLITICS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 305 (2014)
(stating that "in a new departure for integration, it was one country in particular that set
the agenda. Germany, the economic powerhouse of the Eurozone and the biggest
contributor to bailout packages, played a central role in determining that indebted
countries would need to implement austerity.").
46. See, e.g., Korkein hallinto-oikeus [KHO] [Supreme Administrative Court] May 14,
2013, 2013:90 (Fin.) (Finnish Supreme Administrative Court ordering the publication of
the deal between the Finnish Minister of Finance and the Greek counterpart to obtain
collateral as a conditions to grant financial aid to Greece, which was largely seen as
imposing austerity).
47. See generally Pdiivi Leino & Janne Salminen, The Euro Crisis and its
Constitutional Consequences for Finland: Is There Room for National Politics in EU
Decision-Making?, 9 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 451 (2013) (detailing Finland's skeptical
response to recent EMU developments, especially concerning democratic decisionmaking).
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although it has been suggested that austerity was welcomed by some
national elites in Southern Europe-for example in Italy or Greece,
which conveniently put the blame on Germany to pass domestic reforms
which could not otherwise have been adopted 48 -technocratic
governments were eventually ousted by politicians elected on platforms
that explicitly opposed austerity. 49 Yet, the election of anti-austerity
parties in these countries did not produce changes to EU policies,
suggesting that as long as Germany remains committed to a policy of
austerity, it is unlikely that any economic change will be foreseeable in
the European Union. 50
The case of Greece, of course, epitomizes this state of affairs. The
tough austerity policy that the technocratic government of Lucas
Papademos and the center-right government of Antonis Samaras
implemented as a condition for financial assistance by European and
international creditors had a huge impact on Greek society, 51 shrinking
domestic economic output by 25 percent between 2011 and 2014.52 In
reaction to this, the snap elections in January 2015 swept an antiausterity coalition led by the leftist party Syriza into power with a clear
mandate to renegotiate the conditions set in the bailout and to remedy
the humanitarian crisis shaking the nation. 53 However, the new Greek
government was quickly forced to bow to the pressures of its European
partners. 54 In February 2015, after tense negotiations-especially with
48. See Susannah Verney & Anna Bosco, Living ParallelLives: Italy and Greece in an
Age of Austerity, 18 S. EUR. SOC'Y & POL. 397, 421 (2014) (discussing action by
technocratic governments in Italy and Greece).
49. See Hauke Brunkhorst, Collective Bonapartism - Democracy in the European
Crisis, 15 GER. L.J. 1177, 1179 (2014).
50. See A Teutonic Union, ECONOMIST, Sept. 13, 2014, http://www.economist.conl
news/europe/21616954-behind- scenes-germany- quietly-asserts-its-influence-brusselsteutonic-union (stating that "the euro crisis has shifted power decisively to Angela
Merkel's Germany" and arguing that this power has now been entrenched).
51. See Philippe Legrain, Op-Ed, Euro-Zone Fiscal Colonialism, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21,
2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/22/opinioneuro-zone-fiscal-colonialism.html?_r=0
(arguing that management of the Euro-crisis has created "quasi-colonial relationship"
between EU member states).
52. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2014 INVESTMENT CLIMATE STATEMENT - GREECE 1 (June
(reporting
25%
2014),
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/229022.pdf
contraction of Greek GDP).
53. See Patrick Donahue, Tsipras Win Draws French Congratulations,German Theat,
http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_warticles_
EKATHIMERINI
(Jan.
26,
2015),
wsitel 126/01/2015_546536.
54. See also Federico Fabbrini, The Greek Crisis and the Need for Constitutional
Reform in the Eurozone, VERFASSUNGSBLOG (Mar. 21, 2015), http://www.verfassungsblog.de/
making-elections-matter-again-the-greek-crisis-and-the-need-for-constitutiona-reformsin-the-eurozone/#.VTKI5a3BzGc (discussing negotiations between Greece and its
creditors).
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the German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schduble-and facing a likely
financial shortfall, the Greek Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis had to
concede that its government would not roll back on the previously
agreed-to reform plans, and would implement domestically its electoral
55
promises only if doing so had "no negative fiscal effect."
The case of France and Italy-the second and third largest
Eurozone member states-also offers a striking snapshot of that reality.
Although Frangois Hollande campaigned in 2012 on a platform that
advocated repeal of the Fiscal Compact and a strategy to promote
growth and tackle unemployment, 56 once he became the president of
France he was forced to backtrack on his promises. Leading a country
weakened by increasing economic difficulties, 57 President Hollande had
to cultivate special relations with Germany to keep France afloat and
ended up implementing the German economic blueprint 5 -- extracting in
exchange only a largely symbolic, and non-legally binding, Compact for
Growth and Jobs. 59 In fact, when in August 2014 the French Minister of
the Economy, a prominent member of the left wing of the Socialist
Party, openly criticized the German-led policy of austerity, the French
President removed him, suggesting that in the intergovernmental
framework of the European Council, France is in no condition to
60
challenge the position of Germany.
Similarly, the electoral victory of Italy's Democratic Party in 2013
on an anti-austerity platform did not produce visible change in EU
55. Letter from Yanis Varoufakis, Fin. Minister of Greece, to Jeroen Dijsselbloem,
President of the Eurogroup (Feb. 24, 2015), available at http://www.reuters.com/
article/2015/02/24/us-eurozone-greece-text-idUSKBNOLSOV520150224.
56. See Steven Erlanger & Nicholas Kulish, French Front-Runner Says He'd Seek to
Renegotiate Fiscal Treaty if Elected, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/04/26/world/europe/hoUande-says-hell-seek-new-fiscal-treaty-if-elected-infrance.html?_r=0.
57. See also the report to the French Prime Minister by the Commission chaired by
Louis Gallois (the so-called Rapport Gallois), Louis Gallois, Pacte Pour La Compgtitivitg
De Lindustrie Franqaise(Nov. 5, 2012), for a discussion of the weak state of France's
economy and a proposal for a competiveness pact for industry.
58. See e.g., Loi 2012-1403 du 17 d6cembre 2012 relative A la programmation et A la
gouvernance des finances publiques [Law 2012-1403 of December 17, 2012 on the
programming and governance of public finances], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE
FRANCAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Dec. 18, 2012, p. 19816. (Fr.)
(incorporating the Fiscal Compact in France).
59. See European Council Conclusions EUCO 76/12 of 29 June 2012, Annex.
60. See Liz Alderman & Dan Bilefsky, New French Cabinet Sheds Critics and Leaves
Austerity Policies in Place, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/
2014/08/27/world/europe/france-new-government.html?_r=0
(reporting decision by the
French President to charge the Prime Minister to form a new cabinet ousting the former
French Minister of the Economy Arnaud Montebourg, a prominent leftist, who had openly
criticized Germany for imposing austerity policy on the other EU member states).
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economic policy. Because of a number of weaknesses in its domestic
institutional system, Italy has traditionally been characterized by
unstable executives and has thus been able to wield only limited
influence in EU intergovernmental fora. 61 Things have changed in 2014
with the appointment of Matteo Renzi's government, which has
embraced a more assertive role in EU policy making, not least because
Italy happened to hold the rotating six-month presidency of the Council
of the European Union 62 in the second half of 2014.63 Nevertheless, Italy
also suffers long-standing structural economic problems, notably a
public debt that for decades has ranked as one of the highest in the
Eurozone. 64 These economic weaknesses have so far prevented Italy
from effectively rebalancing power in the European 65Council and pushing
for an alternative economic agenda at the EU level.
In conclusion, Europe has embraced austerity policy as a way to
respond to the crisis. The prevailing narrative since 2009 considered
irresponsible state fiscal behavior the main cause of the crisis.
Unsurprisingly, therefore, policy makers advocated budget cuts and
fiscal consolidation as the main strategy to address the crisis and
restore economic confidence. Yet, despite the increasing discontent for
austerity, this policy has remained resilient over the years. The
explanation of this entrenchment has to do with the evolving relations
between the EU member states and the growing centrality that
Germany-the largest EU member state and its economic powerhousehas come to play in EU decision making. The promotion of austerity
largely tracked German preferences-not only its long-term, ordoliberal
conception of economic governance, but also its short-term interests in
protecting the domestic banking sector. At the same time, because of the
disproportionate influence wielded by Germany within the EU
61. See Tallberg, supranote 25, at 690.
62. See TEU, supra note 3, art. 16(9) (stating that the presidency of the Council shall
be held by every member state on the basis of equal rotation).
63. See

generally

2014

ITALIAN

PRESIDENCY

COUNCIL

EuR.

UNION,

http://italia2014.eu/en/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2014).
64. See Government Debt Increased to 93.9% of GDP in Euro Area and to 88.0% in
EU28, EUROSTAT NEWS RELEASE EUROINDICATORS, July 22, 2014, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostatdocuments/2995521/5175186/2-22072014-AP-EN.PDF/
86c55faa-ea8c-42f9-b9cb-e0dlbe68e957 (reporting Italy's debt to GDP ratio as the second
highest in the EU after Greece).
65. But see Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the
Council, the European Central Bank, the Economic and Social Committee, the Committee
of the Regions and the EuropeanInvestment Bank, Making the Best Use of the Flexibility
within the Existing Rules of the Stability and Growth Pact, COM (2015) 12 final (Jan. 13,
2015) (recognizing the importance of a flexible application of the existing rules of the SGP
to account for a downswing in the economic conditions of EU member states as repeatedly
advocated by the Italian government).
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intergovernmental decision-making fora, no electoral result at the
national level has substantially affected the direction of EU economic
policy.
II. INTERINSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND EU ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE

If the resilience of austerity has revealed a growing imbalance of
powers among the EU member states, the definition of economic policy
in the European Union during the Euro-crisis also reflects a deeper
interinstitutional development in the architecture of the European
Union. Whereas the predominance of austerity policy under the
influence of Germany may be contingent, and subject to future
changes, 66 the events unleashed by the Euro-crisis have highlighted how
the European Council has structurally become the central institution in
setting the economic agenda of the European Union. Although the
European Council had historically played an important role at key
moments in the history of European integration, 67 its role used to be
subsidiary. In fact, until the Lisbon Treaty entered into force in 2009,
the European Council was not recognized as an official institution of the
European Union. 66 Since the eruption of the crisis, the European
Council has moved to the forefront, becoming an institution regularly
involved in deciding the agenda of the European Union and its member
states. 69 In the field of economic governance, in particular, the European
Council has become the leading EU institution, and "economic
governance occupies 50-65% of the total time the heads [of state and
government] spend debating within the European Council." 70
Although some observers may suggest that the rise of the European
Council is only a temporary evolution triggered by exceptional
circumstances such as the Euro-crisis, as Uwe Puetter has argued, the
centrality of the European Council in the field of economic governance is

66. It should be remembered that in the late 1990s Germany was regarded as the "sick
man of the Euro" and played a much more limited role in EU policy making. See The Sick
Man of the Euro, ECONOMIST, June 3, 1999, available at http://www.economist.com
node/209559 (emphasizing German economic stagnation in the decade following
reunification).
67. See generally LuuK VAN MIDDELAAR, THE PASSAGE TO EUROPE: HOW A CONTINENT
BECAME A UNION (Liz Waters trans., 2013) (2009).
68. See Editorial Comments, An Ever Mighty European Council - Some Recent
InstitutionalDevelopments, 46 COMM. MKT. L. REV. 1383, 1385 (2009).
69. See generally FREDERIC EGGERMONT, THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN

COUNCIL IN THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (2012) (describing
the formation of the European Council).
70. Puetter, supra note 23, at 7.
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not a haphazard development. 71 Rather, the European Council's central
role is the result of a deliberate institutional choice made at the time of
the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 and has only become fully noticeable
today.7 2 When creating the EMU, the EU member states established a
supranational authority-the European Central Bank (ECB)-to
manage the monetary pillar of the EMU73 but refrained from
introducing a full-fledged

communitarization

of economic

policy.7 4

Instead, the economic pillar of the EMU has since the beginning been
characterized by the coordination of the economic policies of the EU
member states, which was to be accomplished through an
intergovernmental framework designed to foster deliberation and
consensus-building between them. 75 According to Puetter, this is the
paradox of integration in post-Maastricht Europe: "while policy
interdependencies have grown, member state governments have
resisted the further transfer of formal competences to the EU level and
76
did not follow the model of the Community method."
In the EMU, the power to set the economic agenda is entrusted to
the European Council-as well as to the Economic and Financial Affairs
(ECOFIN) Council, which groups the finance ministers of the EU
member states, and to the Eurogroup, which brings together the finance
ministers of the Eurozone countries.7 7 This has important implications
for interinstitutional balance.7 8 In particular, the European
Commission, which had traditionally been-and still is-the engine of
integration in policies such as agriculture, competition, and the internal
79
market, plays a more limited role in the field of economic policy.
Certainly, the Commission remains a key player in the institutional
architecture of the European Union; it enjoys the formal monopoly of
legislative initiative, is endowed of a large bureaucracy, and has

COUNCIL AND THE
COUNCIL: NEW
71. UWE PUETTER,
THE EUROPEAN
INTERGOVERNMENTALISM AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 68 (2014).
72. See id. at 68-69; Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191).
73. See generally CHIARA ZILIOLI & MARTIN SELMAYR, THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN
CENTRAL BANK (2001) (explaining the establishment of the European Monetary Union).
74. PUETTER, supra note 71, at 17.
75. Id. at 59.
76. Uwe Puetter, Europe's Deliberative Intergovernmentalism:The Role of the Council
and European Council in EU Economic Governance, 19 J. EUR. PUB. POL. 161, 161 (2002).
77. See generally UWE PUETTER, THE EUROGROUP: HOW A SECRETIVE CIRCLE OF
FINANCE MINISTERS SHAPE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE (2006) (explaining the
Eurogroup).
78. Youri Devuyst, The European Union's Institutional Balance after the Treaty of
Lisbon: "Community Method" and "DemocraticDeficit"Reassessed, 39 GEO. J. INT'L L. 247,
314 (2008).
79. PUETTER, supra note 71, at 230.
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enforcement power vis-A-vis the member states.8 0 As Paul Craig has
explained, in response to the crisis, the Commission has had a
significant role in pushing through legislative reforms to the
architecture of economic governance in the European Union.8 1
Moreover, the Commission has acquired new powers to police the
budgetary policy of the member states.8 2 In fact, the Commission has
been very diligent in forcing the member states to abide by the austerity
83
policy set at the European level.
Nevertheless, the Commission's ability to define the economic
agenda of the European Union is largely dependent on the European
Council. 84 As it appeared during the Euro-crisis, the Commission was
mainly tasked with implementing decisions made by the European
Council.85 In fact, the legislative reforms of the architecture of the
EMU-the so-called "six pack" and "two pack" sets of regulations and
directives reforming the SGP-were dictated by the European Council
on the basis of the report on "Strengthening Economic Governance in
Europe,"8 6 which was prepared by the President of the European

80. See Renaud Dehousse & Laurie Boussaguet, L'impact de la crise sur la gouvernance
europdenne, 149 POUVOIRS 7 (2014).
81. Paul Craig, The Financial Crisis, the EU Institutional Order and Constitutional
Responsibility, in WHAT FORM OF GOVERNMENT FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE
EUROZONE? 17 (Federico Fabbrini et al. eds., 2015).
82. Roland Bieber, Observer - Policeman - Pilot?: On Lacunae of Legitimacy and the
Contradictionsof FinancialCrisis Management in the European Union 9 (EUI Law Dep't
Working Paper No. 16, 2011).
83. The role of Mr. Olh Rehn, the former European Commissioner for Economic and
Monetary Affairs and the Euro, in promoting austerity policies has been particularly
emphasized. See Maroun Labaki & Beatrice Delvaux, Moi, Olli Rehn, au service de
l'Europe et des Europens, LE SOIR, Feb. 25, 2014 (reporting Mr. Oi Rehn's, the former
European Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs and the Euro, role in
promoting austerity policy and the confrontation between Mr. Rehn and Mr. Paul
Magnette, the President of the Belgian Socialist Party); see also Commission Report,
European Commission 2010-2014 A Record of Achievements, at 24 (Apr. 2014), available
at httpJ/ec.europa.eu/archives/commission_2010-2014/presidenttachievements/filesRoAEN.pdf
(reporting Rehn's view that his work at the European Commission had contributed to
"protect financial stability and restore fiscal and economic credibility").
84. See generally Dermont Hodson & Uwe Puetter, The European Union and the
Economic Crisis, in EUROPEAN UNION PoLiTics 367 (Michelle Cini & Nieves P6rezSol6rzano Borragin eds., 4th ed. 2013) (explaining the role of the Commission in fiscal
policy).
85. See generally European Parliamentary Research Service, European Council
Conclusions: A Rolling Check-List of Commitments to Date, PE 536.361 (Nov. 14, 2014)
(reporting the growing list of actions that the European Council tasks the Commission to
carry forward).
86. See Report of the Task Force of the European Council on Strengthening Economic
Governance in the EU, at 1-4 (Oct. 21, 2010), available at https://www.consilium.europa.eu/
uedocs/cms_data/docspressdataenecdl17236.pdf (identifying five pillars for reform,
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Council in October 2010 and steered by the Economic and Financial
Committee (EFC)-the powerful intergovernmental body that prepares
the work of the ECOFIN Council.8 7 Equally, it was the European
Council that designed the architecture of the programs of financial
rescue with related conditionality, 8which
the Commission then executed
8

jointly with the ECB and the IMF.

Interestingly enough, the centrality of the European Council in EU
economic policy has not been altered by the recent push to connect the
appointment of the European Commission to the election of the
European Parliament.8 9 At the May 2014 European Parliament
elections, the European political parties decided to advance lead
candidates for the position of President of the European Commission,
claiming that the candidate of the European party that would win the
European Parliament elections ought to become the President of the
Commission. 90 This initiative was grounded in the new Article 17(7) of
the TEU, as modified by the Lisbon Treaty of 2009, which states that
the European Council shall appoint the President of the European
Commission "[taking into account [the results of] the elections to the
European Parliament." Following this procedure, Jean-Claude Juncker,
the Spitzenkandidat (top candidate) 91 of the conservative European
Peoples' Party (which came in as the party with a plurality of 29.4
percent of seats), 92 was nominated European Commission President by

namely: (1) greater fiscal discipline; (2) broader economic surveillance; (3) deeper economic
coordination via the European Semester; (4) more robust framework for crisis
management; and (5) stronger institutions for more effective economic governance).
87. PUETTER, supranote 71, at 117-18.
88. Michael Schwartz, A Memorandum of Misunderstanding- The Doomed Road of the
European Stability Mechanism and a Possible Way Out: Enhanced Cooperation, 51
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 389, 390-97 (2014).
89. See Daniel Kelemen & Anan Menon, Fight Club: When the EU's Campaign Season
Ends, the Real PoliticalBattles Will Begin, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, May 18, 2014 (anticipating
continuing centrality of the European Council after the elections for the European
Parliament).
90. Commission Recommendation on Enhancing the Democraticand Efficient Conduct
of the Election to the EuropeanParliament,at 4, COM (2013) 1303 final (Mar. 12, 2013).
91. Editorial Comments, After the European Elections: Parliamentary Games and
Gambles, 51 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1047, 1048 (2014) (discussing the political origin of the
process of the leading candidates and arguing that "[s]omewhat tellingly, and indicating a
certain unwillingness to embrace the concept in other Member States, the candidates have
become known under their German name Spitzenkandidaten throughout the EU'). See
also infra note 98 (discussing influence of the German constitutional mindset over the
emergence of this new procedure for selecting the possible President of the European
Commission).
92. Result of the 2014 EuropeanElections, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (July 1, 2014, 10:14
AM), http://www.results-elections20l4.eu/en/election-results-2014.html.
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the European Council in June 2014,93 and confirmed in the post by a
vote of the Parliament's plenary in July 2014. 94 President-elect Juncker
then negotiated with the EU member states represented in the Council
a list of Commissioners (one per member state),95 who were vetted
through hearings by the European Parliament and eventually confirmed
by the European Parliament as the new College of Commissioners in
October 2014.96
The election of the new European Parliament, and the decision by
the political parties to bring forward lead candidates to the post of
Commission President, attracted increasing attention in the European
Union. 97 A growing number of scholars and opinion makers hailed the
event as the institutional evolution of the European Union toward a
parliamentary system of government, akin to the German model, 98 with
the injection of electoral competition for the choice of who should run
the European Union and in which direction. 99 According to some
accounts, the election would also craft a space for contestation between
the Left and the Right, and thus create the conditions for a change in
economic policy, moving away from austerity and focusing more on
growth. 100
93. European Council Conclusions EUCO 79/14 of 27 June 2014 (proposing the
appointment of Jean-Claude Juncker with twenty-six heads of state and government in
favor, and two against).
94. See Press Release, European Parliament, ParliamentElects Jean-Claude Juncker
as Commission President (July 15, 2014) (reporting vote to elect Jean-Claude Juncker as
Commission President with 422 votes in favor, 250 against, and 47 abstained).
95. See Press Release, Council of the European Union, Council Adopts New List of
Commissioners-Candidates (Oct. 15, 2014) (reporting the final list of Commissionerscandidates designated by the Council, in common accord with President-elect Juncker,
following the resignation of one of the previous candidates in light of her negative
performance during the parliamentary hearings).
96. See Press Release, European Parliament, Parliament Elects New European
Commission (Oct. 22, 2014) (reporting vote to approve the new College of Commissioners
with 423 votes in favor, 209 against, and 67 abstentions).
97. See, e.g., Joseph H.H. Weiler, Editorial, European Parliament Elections 2014:
Europe's Fateful Choices, 24 EuR. J. INT'L L. 747 (2013) (explaining issues at stake in the
election).
98. See Mattias Kumm, What Kind of a Constitutional Crisis Is Europe in and What
Should Be Done About It? 18 (Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin ffir Sozialforschung [WZB]
Discussion Paper No. 801, 2013) (showing German support and influence for the idea of
parliamentarizing the EU).
99. See, e.g., MARCELINO OREJA ET AL., PROPOSALS FOR THE FUTURE OF EUROPE: THE
ROAD TO AN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL UNION 19 (2014).
100. See, e.g., Simon Hix & Christoph Crombez, Why the EuropeanParliamentElections
Will Be About More Than Protest Votes, LONDON SCHOOL ECONOMICS BLOG (June 3, 2013),
http://blogs.Ise.ac.UKleuroppblog/2013/06/03/european-parliament-elections-2014/ (stating
that European elections will determine whether or not austerity remains the EU policy to
address the Euro-crisis).
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However, this did not happen. On the one hand, the appointment of
the President of the Commission following the Spitzenkandidaten
process did not deprive the member states of the privilege of nominating
the other Commissioners, with the result that the College of
Commissioners is not a homogenous political body, but rather a
patchwork of national interests, reflecting heterogeneous political
positions. 10 1 On the other hand, the European Council crucially
reaffirmed its centrality in defining the economic agenda of the
European Union despite steps toward the parliamentarization of the
relationship between the European Parliament and the Commission. In
the same summit in which it decided to nominate Jean-Claude Juncker
as President of the European Commission, the European Council
unveiled a detailed program, which it tasked the new Commission to
carry forward. In a document called "Strategic Agenda for the Union in
Times of Changes,"'1 2 the European Council outlined the policy priority
for the European Union in the next five years and tasked the future
European Commission to implement it.103 As far as economic policy is
concerned, the European Council mentioned the plague of
unemployment and emphasized its commitment toward "stronger
economic policy coordination, convergence and solidarity." 104
Nevertheless, the European Council reaffirmed the importance of
respecting the SGP, of pursuing structural reforms, and of encouraging
competitiveness105-thus suggesting a continuation of the policies so far
followed to address the crisis.
In fact, in its subsequent meetings since the appointment of the new
European Commission, the European Council has continued to set the
economic direction of the European Union, using its "conclusions" as "an
instrument for exercising leadership."'1 6 Hence, in October 2014 the
European Council reaffirmed "the urgency of the prompt
implementation of measures to boost jobs, growth, competitiveness and

101. See also John Peterson, The College of Commissioners, in THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION 96, 112 (John Peterson & Michael Shackleton eds., 3rd ed. 2012).
102. European Council Conclusions, supra note 93, at Annex 1.
103. European Commission President Juncker himself took notice of this Strategic
Agenda when delivering his speech in front of the European Parliament to obtain its vote
of approval. See Jean-Claude Juncker, Candidate President Eur. Comm'n, Speech at the
European Parliament: "A New Start for Europe: My Agenda for Jobs, Growth and
Democratic Change" (July 15, 2014) (outlining his political agenda but acknowledging that
he will also "draw on the 'Strategic Agenda for the Union in Times of Change', as adopted
by the European Council ... and on the orientations that will be given by the European
Parliament in the months to come.").
104. European Council Conclusions, supranote 93, at 16.
105. Id. at 15.
106. PUETTER, supra note 71, at 134.

INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES

22:2

of those aimed at empowering and protecting its citizens as set out in
the Strategic Agenda for the Union in Times of Change."'107 And in
December 2014, the European Council called for setting up the
European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI) and invited the
Parliament and the Council to pass appropriate legislation within six
months, while introducing some caveats on the use of the fund. 08 The
proposal to establish the EFSI, aimed at mobilizing C315 billion to kickstart investment in the European Union, constituted the flagship
initiative of the new European Commission. 109 But it is significant that
in unveiling its investment plan in November 2014, the Commission
explicitly asked the European Council to endorse its initiative" 0 -even
though this was not formally needed-confirming that also in the
perception of the Commission itself it is the European Council that
holds the keys for the adoption of any new major economic policy
measure in the European Union.
In conclusion, the resilience of austerity policies in response to the
Euro-crisis has brought to the surface an important underground
institutional evolution within the European Union. In defining the
strategy to respond to the crisis, the European Council has emerged as
the leading institution in setting EU economic policy. As Uwe Puetter
has explained, however, this institutional development finds its roots in
the post-Maastricht integration paradox, in which member states
agreed to coordinate their economic policies at the EU level but not to
The new
entrust new tasks to supranational authorities."'
intergovernmentalism in the field of economic governance has
significantly reduced the traditional role of the European Commission.
In fact, not even the changes produced by associating the appointment
of the European Commission President with the elections for the
European Parliament have deprived the European Council of the power
to set the EU agenda in the field of economic policy. Regardless of the

107. European Council Conclusions EUCO 169/14 of 24 October 2014, 10.
108. European Council Conclusions EUCO 237/14 of 18 December 2014, 1-3.
109. See Communication From the Commission to the European Parliament, the
Council, the EuropeanEconomic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions,
Commission Work Programme 2015: A New Start, at 4, COM (2014) 910 final (Dec. 16,
2014) (emphasizing priority importance of EFSI in the Commission work program).
110. See Communication From the Commission to the European Parliament, the
Council, the EuropeanEconomic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions,
An Investment Plan for Europe, at 6, COM (2014) 903 final (Nov. 26, 2014) (stating that
"[t]he European Council is invited to endorse the setting up of the [EFSI]"); id. at 13
(stating that "[t]he European Council is invited to endorse the overall approach"); id. at 16
(stating that "[tihe Commission invites the European Council... to endorse the Plan with
all its strands").
111. PUETTER, supra note 71, at 161.
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substantive economic strategy promoted by the European Council, the
rise of this institution to the helm of decision making in economic affairs
is a structural institutional development in the architecture of the
European Union which must be reckoned with.
III. PROBLEM AND PROPOSAL: STRENGTHENING THE PRESIDENCY OF THE
EUROPEAN COUNCIL

As the previous parts have explained, the resilience of austerity in
Europe is the result of a growing imbalance between the member states,
with Germany playing a dominating role in the EU decision-making
process. Yet, this state of affairs is the outcome of a structural
institutional development, in which the European Council has risen to
the helm in governing economic policy in the European Union.
Nevertheless, the role that the European Council has come to play in
EU economic governance is a problematic development. As Part II
explained, the working methods of the European Council follow an
intergovernmental logic. And as Part I indicated, in a framework of
intergovernmental governance stronger member states will come to
dominate others. The Euro-crisis has epitomized this situation, with
Germany acquiring a hegemonic position in the EU decision-making
process and promoting austerity as the policy to address the crisis. 112
This institutional state of affairs, however, is not sustainable in the
long run. And it is not unsustainable simply because it is Germany that
is currently calling the shots, or because it is austerity that is now being
promoted. Rather, this institutional state of affairs is unsustainable
because it strikes at the heart of the constitutional balance on which the
European Union, as a union of states and citizens, is founded. 113 The
project of European integration is inherently built on an anti-hegemonic
idea, bred in the tragic experiences of two world wars and secular
attempts by European states to subjugate each other.1 14 Because of the
European history, a shift in the EU institutional framework to a system
in which some member states dominate over the others is simply
untenable. 115 As Paul Magnette and Kalypso Nicolaidis have put it, "[In
112. See Paterson, supra note 28, at 57; see also GLENCROSS, supra note 45, at 305.
113. See Simone Bunse & Kalypso Nicolaidis, Large Versus Small States: AntiHegemony and the Politics of Shared Leadership, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION 249, 251-57 (Erik Jones et al. eds., 2012).
114. See Fabbrini, supra note 20, at 20.
115. The fact that Europe is built on an anti-hegemonic project makes unconvincing the
idea that a Franco-German couple must be the engine of European integration. See, e.g.,
Wolfgang Schauble, German Minister of Finance, Speech at the European University
Institute (Mar. 7, 2012) (defending special role of the entente between Germany and
France). While for historical reasons agreement between France and Germany is
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the European Union,] legitimacy largely depends on the trust of all
constitutive parts: if some states felt that they are considered as minor
elements by the large states, their confidence would be low and the
116
overall level of legitimacy of the EU would be undermined."
In fact, the events occurring since the eruption of the Euro-crisis
have precisely confirmed the risk associated with interstate domination
emerging in intergovernmental frameworks. Massive street protests
against austerity in national capitals throughout the European Union
targeted citizen anger against Germany, which was perceived as
illegitimately imposing its policy preferences on the rest of the
European Union.117 Citizens in a plurality of smaller, economically
weaker member states-but now also in larger countries of the
Eurozone-have expressed their discontent toward a system that they
feel unable to influence by increasingly casting their ballots for
18
extremist, anti-system parties-as evident both in the latest national
and European elections. 119 In the absence of adequate fora at the
European level in which to voice alternative economic blueprints to
address the Euro-crisis, the option of exit from the EMU has returned to
the table as a least-worse alternative to the current state of affairs, in
which foreign countries decide economic governance subject to limited
constraints. 20 The management of the Euro-crisis by the European
Council and the domination by some states over others within the
functioning of this intergovernmental framework has produced a major
12
problem of legitimacy in the European Union. '

important to move the integration process, these are just two members in a complex and
pluralist union of states and citizens.
116. Paul Magnette & Kalypso Nicolaidis, Large and Small Member States in the
European Union: Reinventing the Balance 31 (Notre Europe Research Paper No. 25, 2003).
117. See Sergio Fabbrini, Intergovernmentalismand Its Limits: Assessing the European
Union's Answer to the Euro Crisis, 46 COMP. POL. STUD. 1003, 1022 (2013).
118. See Nicole Scicluna, Politicization Without Democratization: How the Eurozone
Crisis Is Transforming EU Law and Politics, 12 INT'L J. CONST. L. 545, 550-53 (2014)
(discussing the rise of extreme parties in Greece following the crisis).
119. See Corinne Deloy & Pascale Joannin, Les forces de droite sortent victorieuses des
glections europdennes marqudes par une poussde populiste dans plusiers Etats membres,
Question d'Europe, FONDATION ROBERT SCHUMAN (May 26, 2014), http://www.robertschuman.eulfr/questions-d-europe/03 14-les-forces-de-droite-sortent-victorieuses-deselections-europeennes-marquees-par-une-poussee (discussing rise in turnout of Euroskeptic, populist parties in a plurality of EU member states during the May 2014 elections
to the European Parliament).
120. See Antonio Estella, PotentialExit from the Eurozone: The Case of Spain, 22 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 95, 96 (2015).
121. See generally JURGEN HABERMAS, THE CRISIS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (Ciaran
Cronin trans., 2012) (emphasizing the problems of legitimacy created by a governance
system based on "executive federalism").
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Because of the importance of non-domination in the European
Union, the institutional dynamic triggered by the Euro-crisis calls for an
urgent reflection on how to reform the EU constitutional architecture in
order to restore a fair balance between the member states in the EU
decision-making process, and at the same time to ensure the legitimacy
of the EU policies set in the economic domain. I want to emphasize,
however, that the need for an institutional change in Europe goes
beyond the specific problem of austerity. In other words, while austerity
and German domination have unleashed this debate, the need for an
institutional reform would be equally important if-say-the European
Council was dominated by a French-Italian alliance, promoting
Keynesian policies of public spending to foster growth. It is in itself the
dynamic of domination, with the resulting illegitimacy of the decisions
taken under such allocation of powers, that is ultimately a problem for
the sustainability of the European Union. And it is for this reason that,
while agreeing on the substance of recent proposals to move the EU
economic focus away from austerity toward growth, 122 I fundamentally
disagree that this can be done through a new coalition of anti-austerity
member states taking control of the European Council as some have
suggested. 123 Alternative institutional ideas must be advanced to
address the status quo.
My core proposal is that the European Union should strengthen the
role of the President of the European Council as a viable antidote to the
dynamics
of
interstate
domination
occurring
within
an
intergovernmental setting and as the way to create a genuine space in
which a democratic competition on the policies of the European Union
can occur. Whereas, in the current form, the European Council has
turned into a forum in which larger states (today notably Germany) can
dominate the decision-making process, a stronger presidency of the
European Council-that is, a President endowed with autonomous
power and selected through a proper pan-European democratic
process 124-could enjoy the capacity to act free from states' control; in
122. See G20 Leaders' Communiqud, Brisbane Summit, 15-16 November 2014, G20.ORG
1 (Nov. 16, 2014), https://g20.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/brisbane-g2Oleaders_
summit_communiquel.pdf (indicating that the highest priority for wealthy nations should
be to raise growth and deliver jobs); see also OECD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: DATABASE
INVENTORY (2014) (calling for growth policies).
123. See, e.g., Marco Damilano, Intervista:"In Europa coalizione contro i populisti"
Parla Prodi, L'ESPRESSO (May 22, 2014) (It.), available at http://espresso.repubblica.it
plus/articolil20l4/05/22/news/in-europa-e-inevitabile-unagrande-coalizione-dala-politicaa-twitter-parla-romano-prodi-1.166422 (former European Commission President Romano
Prodi arguing for an alliance between Italy, France, and Spain to overtake German control
of the European Council).
124. See infra Parts IV-VI.
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fact, to control states so that none of them can impose its preferences on
the others. At the same time, a strengthened presidency of the
European Council would increase the effectiveness and legitimacy of the
executive power within the European Union, by endowing a monocratic
office with the authority to exercise effective leadership, 125 and by
securing that this authority is (perceived as) legitimate because it is
1 26
directly connected to the people's will.
In proposing to strengthen the President of the European Council, I
am aware of the recent efforts that have been made to boost the role of
the President of the European Commission. As mentioned in Part II, at
the May 2014 European Parliament elections, political parties decided
to bring forward lead candidates for the post of Commission President.
Jean-Claude Juncker was appointed President of the European
Commission through this process. 127 Many have argued that this
process should not be rolled back, as it may develop into something
bigger in the future. 28 In fact, leaving aside the question of whether the
Spitzenkandidaten process will be replicated, 129 it seems that Mr.
Juncker has been able to capitalize on the modalities of his appointment
as Commission President. 130 Notwithstanding the explosion of a tax
125. On the problem of leadership in the EU see generally LEADERLESS EUROPE (Jack
Hayward ed., 2008). For a criticism of the EU's management of the Euro-crisis-as well as
of the ways in which the EU has let the Ukrainian crisis slip out of control-see GEORGE
SOROS, THE TRAGEDY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: DISINTEGRATION OR REVIVAL? (2014).
126. Note that in this article I am using the concept of legitimacy to refer to input
legitimacy, or "process legitimacy." See Joseph H.H. Weiler, The Political and Legal
Culture of European Integration: An Exploratory Essay, 9 INT'L J. CONST. L. 678, 682
(2011) (distinguishing between input legitimacy, i.e., electoral legitimacy; output
legitimacy, i.e., legitimacy based on the results of EU integration; and Messianic
legitimacy, i.e., the legitimacy deriving from the narrative about the good of EU
integration).
127. See supra pp. 287-88.
128. See, e.g., Yves Bertoncini, New President, New "Constitution"'?, NOTRE ER. TRIB.
http://www.notre-europe.eulmedia/
2014,
available at
July
23,
VIEWPOINT,
newpresidentcommission-bertoncini-ne-jdi-july14.pdfpdf=ok.
129. European Council Conclusions, supra note 93, at 11 (stating that to address strong
concerns by the United Kingdom, "the European Council will consider the process for the
appointment of the President of the European Commission for the future, respecting the
European Treaties."). But see Daniel Kelemen, Towards a New ConstitutionalArchitecture
in the EU?, in WHAT FORM OF GOVERNMENT FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE
EUROZONE? 197 (Federico Fabbrini et al. eds., 2015) (suggesting that it will not be feasible
to revert to the Spitzenkandidatenprocess).
130. But see also James Kanter, European Commission Elects a New Leader, N.Y.
TIMES, July 15, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/201407/16/world/europe/jean-claude(emphasizing how Jean-Claude Juncker is a
juncker-elected-head-of-eu-agency.html
veteran of EU politics and knows well how to play in its intricacies, having been Prime
Minister of an EU member state-and thus member of the European Council-for almost
twenty years, and having served as President of the Eurogroup from 2005 to 2013).
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scandal concerning Luxembourg (the state where he had been Prime
Minister between 1995 and 2001) days after taking office, 3 1 Mr.
Juncker received from the European Council a mandate to prepare a
report on the future of the EMU, coordinating the work of the
Presidents of the European Council, the Eurogroup, and the ECB.132 A
preliminary version of this mandate was presented in February 2015.133
This suggests that the prospect of boosting further the executive power
of the President of the European Commission remains one of the
134
possible scenarios for the future of EU governance.
Nevertheless, as I have explained elsewhere, the prospect of
strengthening the presidency of the European Commission by
transforming the European Union into a parliamentary form of
government fares badly from the perspective of the balance of power
between the member states. 135 The transition toward a parliamentary
regime in which the head of the executive is selected by a parliamentary
majority may be suitable to politicize the European Union, but is unable
to restore a meaningful balance between the member states and address
the problem of domination. Because European Parliament seats are
apportioned among member states on the basis of population, albeit
subject to a logic of degressive proportionality, 136 larger states have
greater voice in the European Parliament. 137 However, although the

131. See Matthew Karnitschnig, Luxembourg Tax Leak Puts EU's Juncker Under
Further Pressure, WALL ST. J., Nov. 6, 2014, http://www.wsj.conmarticles/luxembourg-taxleak-puts-eus-juncker-under-furtherpressure-1415276250
(reporting the disclosure of
files indicating that Luxembourg had conceded special tax deals to major multinational
corporations during Mr. Juncker's tenure as Prime Minister, and emphasizing political
backlash for the new Commission President).
132. See European Council Conclusions EUCO 237/14 of 18 December 2014, 3.
133. Jean-Claude Juncker, President Eur. Com'n, Preparing for Next Steps on Better
Economic Governance in the Euro Area: Analytical Note (Feb. 12, 2015), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/docs/economic-governance-note-en.pdf.
134. See Federico Fabbrini, From Executive Federalism to Executive Government:
Current Problems and Future Prospects in the Governance of EMU, in WHAT FORM OF
GOVERNMENT FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE EUROZONE? 289, 301(Federico Fabbrini
et al. eds., 2015).
135. See Fabbrini, supranote 20, at 27.
136. See TEU, supra note 3, art. 14(2) (stating than no member state can have more
than ninety-six seats in the European Parliament and no state shall have less than six).
137. See, e.g., Press Release, European Parliament, Members Elect Chairs and Vicechairs
of
Parliamentary Committees
(July
8,
2014),
available
at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
news/en/newsroom/contentI20140708IPR5181 1/htmlfMembers-elect-chairs-and-vice-chairs-ofparliamentary-committees (reporting that of the twenty-two parliamentary committees,
five chairs went to MEPs elected in Germany, four to MEPs elected in Poland, three to
MEPs elected in Italy, three to MEPs elected in the United Kingdom, two to MEPs elected
in France, and two to MEPs elected in Spain, while the three remaining committees will
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European Parliament has endeavored to structure itself along party
rather than national lines, 138 cleavages between the member states are
evident within the European Parliament 1 39-in fact, they have been
dramatized by the Euro-crisis. 140 In this context, an institutional
solution that entirely shifts to the Parliament the decision on the
election of the President of the European Commission is liable to deepen
the cleavage between larger and smaller states, entrenching, albeit in a
different form, the asymmetry that characterizes the EU member
states. 141
From this point of view, the proposal to strengthen the presidency of
the European Council-notably by electing the office through a
mechanism that tempers majoritarianism with federal concerns 142-can
prevent the resurgence of dynamics of interstate domination and create
a real forum in which EU citizens can voice competing visions of the
European Union. The initiative to strengthen the President of the
European Commission by connecting his or her appointment to the
results of parliamentary elections follows a constitutional logic of fusion
of powers in which the government fulcrum rests on the continuum
between the parliamentary majority and the cabinet. Conversely, the
proposal to strengthen the President of the European Council follows a
constitutional logic of separation of powers in which power is divided,
and shared, by multiple institutions checking and balancing each other.
In a regime of fusion of powers, one institution would be in charge of
running the European Union. However, given the profound
asymmetries that characterize the EU member states, the European
Union cannot afford to be governed by a single institution, be it a
congress of heads of state or government, or a parliamentary assembly
giving its confidence to the executive. 143 As a union of states and
citizens, the European Union can only prosper in an institutional
regime in which separated institutions, each reflecting different logics of
be chaired by an MEP elected in Bulgaria, an MEP elected in Sweden, and an MEP
elected in the Czech Republic).
138. See, e.g., SIMON HIX & BJORN HOYLAND, THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION 130-140 (2011).
139. See Anna Kocharov, In the Image of State: Constitutional Complexities of
Engineeringa EuropeanDemocracy, in WHAT FORM OF GOVERNMENT FOR THE EUROPEAN
UNION AND THE EUROZONE? 233 (Federico Fabbrini et al. eds., 2015).
140. See Fritz Scharpf, Legitimacy Intermediation in the Multilevel European Polity and
Its Collapse in the Eurocrisis, in THE EUROPEAN UNION IN CRISIS OR THE EUROPEAN
UNION AS CRISES? 93, 131 (John Erik Fossum & Augustin Jos6 Men6ndez eds., 2014).
141. See also Andrea Gratteri, Parlamento e Commissione: II difficile equilibrio fra
rappresentanzae governabilit nell'Unione Europea, 2 COMUNITA INTERNAZIONALE 237,
241 (2014).
142. See infra Part V.
143. See Fabbrini, supranote 20, at 31.
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representation, share the power. 144 Strengthening the executive power
of the President of the European Council would be a step toward
embracing separation of powers in the European Union.
At the same time, the idea of strengthening the presidency of the
European Council builds on a recent set of EU constitutional reformsas well as on the latest practice of the EU institutions. The position of
European Council President was introduced at the time of the European
Convention that drafted the EU Constitutional Treaty in 2002-2003.145
Whereas previously the presidency of the European Council tracked the
presidency of the Council-rotating every six months between the
member states14 6 -the Convention decided to formally recognize the
147
European Council as an EU institution endowed with executive tasks,
and to create the position of European Council President as a way to
ensure continuity in the work of the European Council and to steer the
direction of the institution. 148 The proposal to endow the European
Council with a semipermanent president was strongly endorsed by the
larger member states (who saw in this a way to recognize the reality of
states' power) and equally strongly resisted by the smaller member
states (who saw in this a fundamental alteration of the principle of
states' equality).149 Eventually, under the auspices of Convention
President Valery Giscard d'Estaing, 15 0 the presidency of the European
Council made its way into the Constitutional Treaty-and then into the
151
Lisbon Treaty.

144. See also SERGIO FABBRINI, WHICH EUROPEAN UNION? EUROPE AFTER THE EURo

CRISIS (2015) (defending the logic of separation of powers in the EU).
145. See Philippe de Schoutheete, The European Council, in THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION 43, 48 (John Peterson & Michael Shackleton eds., 2012).
146. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community art. 146, Mar. 25,
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter TEC] (stating that the office of President of the Council
shall be held in turn by each member state for a term of six months).
147. Cf. TEU, supra note 3, art. 15(1).
148. See Ben Crum, Accountability and the Personalisationof the European Council
Presidency, 31 J. EUR. INTEGRATION 685, 685 (2009) (arguing that a permanent European
Council president would increase democratic representation and accountability
throughout the organization).
149. See Magnette & Nicolaldis, supra note 116, at 15-18 (arguing that the bargaining
positions of states at the Convention regarding the European Council President were
divided based on the size of the states).
150. See Paul Magnette, Vers un changement de 'rgime politique?, in GENESIS AND
DESTINY OF THE EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION 1065, 1067 (Giuliano Amato et al. eds., 2007)
(discussing the influence of the French constitutional mindset over the institutionalization
of the presidency of the European Council. Institutionalization was strongly favored by
European Convention President Val~ry Giscard D'Estaing, a former President of the
French Fifth Republic).
151. PAUL CRAIG, THE LISBON TREATY: LAW, POLITICS AND TREATY REFORM 78 (2010).
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However, whereas in the Giscardian vision the President of the
European Council ought to have been a strong figure, the text of the
Constitutional Treaty, and then the Lisbon Treaty, constrained its
status and functions to address the concerns of the smaller member
states. 152 First, the President is entitled to head the European Councilnot the European Union as such. 153 Second, the President is elected by a
qualified majority of the heads of state and government congressed in
the European Council and can be removed by them according to the
same procedure in the event of an impediment or a serious
misconduct.154 Third, contrary to institutions such as the Parliament, 155
or (generally) the Commission, 15 6 whose members are elected for a fiveyear term, the President of the European Council remains in office for a
term of two and a half years, renewable only once. 157 And fourth, the
President is empowered to act more as a chairperson of that institution
than as an executive leader.158 Each of these solutions restricted the role
of the President, closely tying him to his peers within the European
Council,1 59 and deprived him of a substantial capacity to shape the
agenda, on the assumption that this would better maintain the
influence of smaller member states on the working of the institution.
Yet, each of these solutions ultimately worked against the interest of
the smaller member states. 60 Ironically, in a context in which the
President of the European Council enjoyed limited power and
legitimacy, it was easier for the biggest member states to impose their
preferences.
This is not to deny that the first President of the European
Council-Mr. Herman Van Rompuy, a former Prime Minister of

152. See Paolo Ponzano, Les institutions de l'Union, in GENESIS AND DESTINY OF THE
EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION 439, 467 (Giuliano Amato et al. eds., 2007) (explaining that the
Treaty sought to limit the powers of the President).
153. See TEU, supra note 3, art. 15(6)(a) (indicating that the President is to chair the
European Council and "drive forward its work").
154. Id. art 15(5).
155. See id. art. 14(3) (stating that "members of the European Parliament shall be
elected for a term of five years").
156. See id. art. 17(3) (stating that "[tihe Commission's term of office shall be five
years"). But see id. art. 17(8) (stating that "the European Parliament may vote on a motion
of censure of the Commission.").
157. Id. art. 15(5).
158. Id. art. 15(6).
159. See CRAIG, supranote 151, at 117 (stating that the current "appointment procedure
for the Presidency of the European Council places the power firmly in the hands of that
body").
160. See generally Fabbrini, supra note 20 (describing the shift of power in the EU from
smaller member states to larger ones).
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Belgium, appointed for two and a half years in November 2009161 and
renewed for a second mandate in March 2012162 -made inroads into
consolidating the position of the presidency and its function in brokering
compromises between the member states. 16 3 As it has been pointed out,
President Van Rompuy has "succeeded in becoming an influential actor
in his own right, through a dutiful exercise of his official powers, clever
exploitation of some legal 'grey zones', and tactful dealing with the
Union's other institutional players." 164 In particular, President Van
Rompuy skillfully invested himself with important responsibilities in
the governance of the EMU, leading the work of two task forces that
prepared the roadmap of the legal and policy responses to the Eurocrisis by the EU institutions and the member states.1 65 In fact, at the
official handover ceremony with his successor-Donald Tusk, the former
Prime Minister of Poland, who was elected in August 2014 as the second
President of the European Council' 6 -- Mr. Van Rompuy affirmed that
the "President of the European Council represents the Union as a
whole."

67

Although technically this is incorrect, since as just mentioned

Article 15 of the TEU only vests in the President the role of
representing the European Council, the statement signals a push
168
toward a kind of presidentialization of EU governance.
Nevertheless, the prospects for such a development remain limited
under the current constitutional arrangement. Under the existing
treaties, the President of the European Council acts mainly as a deal
broker facilitating compromises between member states, and is almost
exclusively endowed with internal procedural powers. 169 As President
Van Rompuy himself put it, his main task is to listen to the heads of
states and government and to build trust between them. 170 In fact, there
161. Press Release, European Council (Nov. 19, 2009).
162. Press Release, European Council (Mar. 1, 2012), EUCO 37/12.
163. See Henri De Waele & Hansko Broeksteeg, The Semi-Permanent European Council
Presidency: Some Reflections on the Law and Early Practice, 49 COMMON MKT. L. REv.
1039 (2012) (studying the changing role and power of the European Council President over
time).
164. Id. at 1070.
165. See generally Report of the Task Force to the European Council, supra note 86. See
also President of the European Council, Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary
Union, 4-5 (Dec. 5, 2012), available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsData/
docs/pressdata/en/ec/134069.pdf.
166. See European Council Conclusions, EUCO 163/14 of 30 August 2014, 2.
167. President Herman Van Rompuy, Remarks at the Handover Ceremony with
President of the European Council Donald Tusk (Dec. 1, 2014), in EUCO 257/14, at 1.
168. See De Waele & Broeksteeg, supra note 163, at 1074.
169. PUETTER, supra note 71, at 114.
170. Herman Van Rompuy, Pres. Eur. Coun., Speech on "Looking Back, Looking
Forward", at The State of the Union Conference, Accademia dei Lincei Rome (Nov. 7,
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is evidence that Germany, the biggest EU member state, has played a
privileged role in influencing the European Council and its President.171
The risks that a weaker presidency would pose to the balance of power
between the member states had not gone unnoticed during the debates
of the Constitutional Convention. 172 Then Greek Foreign Minister
Georgios Papandreou, for instance, had tabled an amendment to
introduce the direct election of the President of the European Council
and justified the proposal stating that "a directly elected President
would strengthen the role of the European citizen, contribute to the
substantial equality of the member states and facilitate a new, stable
'1 73
balance between the institutions."
This article argues that the recent trend toward the consolidation of
the presidency of the European Council should be supported by
adequate institutional reforms that strengthen the office so as to make
it truly the President of the Union as a whole. In constitutional terms,
this implies both new powers and new legitimacy for the institution. On
the one hand, the presidency should be vested with the legal capacity to
make authoritative decisions. 74 The new presidency should have the
power "to take executive economic policy decisions for the EMU."175 The
President should have the authority to set the agenda he or she believes
to be in the best interest of the Union-resisting pressure from the
heads of state and governments (and especially the more powerful
among them), rather than reflecting their preferences. On the other
hand, this extended authority should be connected to, and supported by,
a process of legitimation-that is, a selection mechanism that is

2014), in EUCO 264/14, at 4 (stating that on the basis of the Treaty "the job description
and formal competencies of [the] President are rather vague, even meagre" and claiming
that in his experience "[b]uilding trust is . . . perhaps the most important task of a
European Council President.").
171. See Herman Van Rompuy, Pres. Eur. Coun., Farewell Speech to the Members of
the European Council (Oct. 24, 2014), in EUCO 232/14, at 1 (thanking explicitly only
German Chancellor Angela Merkel).
172. See Magnette & Nicolaidis, supra note 116, at 15 (noting the rationales for the
larger states' plan to strengthen the office of the President of the European Council).
173. Secretariat, Summary Sheet of Proposals for Amendments, CONV 709/03 (May 9,
2003).
174. See Miguel Poiares Maduro, Foreword:Fiscal Capacity and Constitutional Reform
in the EMU, in THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF EUROPEAN BUDGETARY CONSTRAINTS v,

vii (Federico Fabbrini et al. eds., 2014) (making the case for a new political authority in
the EU).
175. See President of the European Council, supra note 165, at 17 (Dec. 5, 2012) (stating
that the crisis has "shown the need to strengthen ... the EMU's. .. ability to take rapid
executive decisions to improve crisis management in bad times and economic
policymaking in good times ....
Reinforcing the capacity of the European level to take
executive economic policy decisions for the EMU is essential.").
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perceived as legitimate by the people throughout the European
Union.176 In a democratic system, such a mechanism can only be the
77
electoral process.1
The proposal to strengthen the role of the President of the European
178
Council has so far not received much scholarly or political attention.
Although proposals for institutional reform have abounded during the
last few years, 179 the initiatives to strengthen the executive power of the
European Union focused mainly on the role of the President of the
European Commission. A proposal articulated by individual policy
makers 8 0 -and also considered by some within the so-called Berlin
Group (the Foreign Affairs Ministers of Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
France, Italy, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland,
Portugal, and Spain) in its September 2012 report on "The Future of
Europe"' 8 1-would introduce the direct election of the President of the
European Commission. 8 2 Nevertheless, this proposal is very different
from the one advanced here, since it would essentially introduce a "neoparliamentary" form of government in the European Union' 83-i.e., a
system in which citizens directly elect a chamber of the legislature as
well as the head of the cabinet, who should then obtain the confidence of
176. See Wojcech Sadurski, DemocraticLegitimacy of the European Union: A Diagnosis
and Some Modest Proposals, 32 POL. Y.B. INTL L. 9, 13 (2013) (arguing that the EU
suffers from a crisis of legitimacy and that "for the Union to maintain (or acquire,
depending on one's perspectives) a modicum of legitimacy, it must be democratic.").
177. See generally Yves M6ny, De la ddmocratie en Europe: Old Concepts, New
Challenges, 41 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 1 (2002) (emphasizing the importance of popular
input while underlying the need for a fresh approach to the problem of democracy).
178. But see DAVID MARQUAND, THE END OF THE WEST: THE ONCE AND FUTURE EUROPE
137 (2011); Sergio Fabbrini, After the Euro-Crisis: The President of Europe, EUROPEOS
COMMENTARY No. 12, June 2012, at 5, 6.
179. See, e.g., INGOLF PERNICE ET AL., A DEMOCRATIC SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS: REFORM
STEPS TOWARDS A DEMOCRATICALLY BASED ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CONSTITUTION FOR
EUROPE 83 (2012); Deirdre Curtin, Challenging Executive Dominance in European
Democracy, 77 MOD. L. REV. 1, 18 (2014).
180. See Wolfgang Schauble, Ger. Minister of Fin., Speech on "The State of Europe:
What Governance is Needed in the European Union?" at the Hertie School of Governance,
(May 27, 2014).
181. See Berlin Group, Final Report of the Future of Europe Group of the Foreign
Ministers of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Germany, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and Spain, 9 (Sept. 17, 2012) (stating that "For some
members of the Group, this could include ...a directly elected Commission President who
appoints the members of his 'European Government' himself .").
182. See also Frank Decker & Jared Sonnicksen, The Direct Election of the Commission
President:A PresidentialApproach to Democratizing the European Union, ZEI DISCUSSION
PAPER NO. C192, 2009, at 24-30.
183. See Francesco Clementi, L'elezione diretta del Primo ministro: lbrigine francese, il
caso israeliano,ildibattito in Italia,20 QUADERNI COSTITUZIONALI 579 (2000) (explaining
the functioning of a "neo-parliamentary" form of government).
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the legislature.184 Yet, comparative analysis makes clear that this form
of government has proved to be largely dysfunctional. Between 1996 and
2001, Israel briefly experimented with this system of government,1 8 5 but
quickly abandoned it in light of the tensions emerging between the
majority-based election of the Prime Minister and the proportionalitybased election of the Knesset, as well as the incapacity to master
186
conflicts between the executive and the legislature.
The proposal to strengthen the presidency of the European Council
follows a different logic. While the idea may be reminiscent of a
semipresidential regime akin to the French model, in which a directly
elected head of state coexists with a cabinet and parliament linked by a
relationship of confidence, 187 the proposal to strengthen the President of
the European Council essentially follows the logic of separation of
powers. 188 The French constitutional system is characterized-save in
times of cohabitation' 8 9-by a marked hierarchical relationship between
the directly elected President, the Prime Minister, and Parliament, 190
and by the remarkable absence of checks and balances on the
presidency.191 In the European Union, instead, there is a clear
separation of powers between the European Council and the European
184. Proposals in favor of the direct election of the President of the European
Commission do not consider this point. However, by not setting aside the power of the
European Parliament to give a vote of approval for the President of the Commission, they
de facto endorse the creation of a "neo-parliamentary" regime.
185. See Basic Law: The Government, 5752-1992, SH No. 1396 p. 214 (Isr.) (introducing
direct election of Prime Minister) and Basic Law: The Government, 5761-2001, SH No.
1780 p. 158 (Isr.) (abolishing previous reform).
186. See Emanuele Ottolenghi, Choosing a Prime Minister: Executive-Legislative
Relations in Israel in the 1990s, 10 J. LEGIS. STUD. 263, 263 (2004).
187. See Maurice Duverger, A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential
Government, 8 EUR. J. POL. RES. 165, 165 (1980).
188. See supra text accompanying note 144.
189. See generally Jean Gicquel, De la cohabitation,49 POUVOIRS 69 (1989) (explaining
that a cohabitation arises whenever the President and the parliamentary majority, and
thus the Prime Minister, belong to different political parties). But see Loi constitutionnelle
2000-964 du 2 octobre 2000 relative A la dur6e du mandat du President de la Rpublique
[Constitutional Law 2000-964 of October 2, 2000 on the Term of Office of the President of
the Republic], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANCAiS [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE
OF FRANCE], Oct. 3, 2000, p. 15582 (modifying Art. 6 1958 CONST. FR. to reduce the length
of the presidential mandate to five years). The effect of this reform has been to bring close
to nil the probability of a cohabitation. See Stefano Ceccanti, Le istituzioni e il sistema
politico dopo il primo "quinquennato",in LA FRANCIA DI SARKOZY 27 (Gianfranco Baldini
& Marc Lazar eds., 2007).
190. See Olivier Duhamel, Remarques sur la notion de rigime semi-prdsidentiel, in
DROIT, INSTITUTIONS ET SYSTEMES POLITIQUES 581, 581 (1987).
191. See MAURO VOLPI, LIBERTA E AUTORITA: LA CLASSIFICAZIONE DELLE FORME DI STATO
E DI GOVERNO 146 (2007) (defining the French form of government as "hyperpresidentialist").
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Parliament, since the former cannot dissolve the latter and the latter
cannot vote out the former. 192 The proposal to strengthen the presidency
of the European Council advanced here builds on and develops this logic
of separation of powers, and is therefore reminiscent of constitutional
systems, such as in the United States where the executive and the
legislature check and balance each other. 193 Even so, contrary to the
U.S. system, which is characterized by a unitary executive, 94 in the
European Union the executive power remains fragmented. 195 This
feature makes the EU form of government peculiar-and, thus, the
proposal to strengthen the presidency of the European Council in need
of further analysis.
Because the proposal to strengthen the President of the European
Council has not received much attention in the European constitutional
law literature, it is necessary to more fully articulate what such a
change would entail. I will attempt this in the remainder of this article.
This requires asking three questions. First, what are the advantages
associated with the establishment of a more solid presidency, and how
should these be reflected in the new powers that would be attributed to
the institution? Second, what should be the mechanism to elect. the
President of the European Council, and how can the asymmetry in
population between the EU member states be reconciled with the choice
of the holder of a monocratic office? Third, what are the challenges
facing the road toward changing the EU treaties to strengthen the
presidency, and how could these practical difficulties be addressed in
the framework of the ongoing debate about the future of the EMU? In
considering each of those questions, I will try to use as a compass the
lessons provided by the comparative constitutional law literature on
forms of government. 196 However, I am aware that I am entering
unchartered territory, and I do not doubt that many of my arguments
will be subject to criticism and require further refinement. I hope,
however, that by starting this debate I will draw scholarly attention to

192. See also SERGIO FABBRINI, COMPOUND DEMOCRACIES 186-87 (2007).
193. See Amie Kreppel, Understanding the European Parliament from a Federalist
Perspective, in COMPARATIVE FEDERALISM: THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED STATES
IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 245 (Anand Menon & Martin Schain eds., 2006).
194. See U.S. CONST. art II, § 1 (stating that "The executive Power shall be vested in a
President of the United States."). See generally Mark Tushnet, A Political Perspective on
the Theory of the Unitary Executive, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 313 (2010) (discussing the
theory of the unitary executive in the United States, with its variants of intensity).
195. DEIRDRE CURTIN, EXECUTIVE POWER OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: LAW, PRACTICES,
AND THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 69 (2009).
196. See generally THE EXECUTIVE AND PUBLIC LAW: POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (Paul Craig & Adam Tomkins eds., 2006) (discussing role of
executive branches in Europe and other countries).
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the merits of this option of institutional reform to improve the
governance of the European Union through reflection and choice, rather
197
than through accident and force.
IV.

POWER AND REPRESENTATION

The proposal to strengthen the role of the President of the European
Council moves the European Union toward the advantages of a
presidential
form
of
government. 198
Scholars
comparing
parliamentarianism and presidentialism have underlined how each of
these forms of government or their hybrids, semi-presidentialism or neoparliamentarianism, has both pros and cons. 199 However, among the
virtues of presidential systems, a political regime in which the people
select the President separately and independently from the legislature,
20 0
scholars usually identify several recurring general benefits.
Presidential systems favor governmental stability because they ensure
the continuity in office of the President for the entire length of the
elected term, regardless of the ongoing confidence of the legislature, as
is the case in parliamentary and neoparliamentary regimes.
Presidential systems provide greater governmental vigor and leadership
because they vest the executive power (or part thereof) into a
monocratic office. Moreover, presidential systems endow the citizens
with the capacity to directly select the president, removing this power
from the legislature and ensuring a direct, rather than mediated,
legitimacy to the chief executive. Presidential systems also inject a
majoritarian logic into the political system, forcing relevant societal
actors to polarize along key political cleavages and counterbalancing the
fragmentation that is inherent whenever the electoral system is based
on proportional representation.
197. See THE FEDERALIST No. 1, at 6 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jim Manis, ed., 2001)
(asking "whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good
government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for
their political constitutions on accident and force.").
198. See also Hodson & Puetter, supra note 84, at 373 (emphasizing '"presidentialization
of euro area governance"); De Waele & Broeksteeg, supra note 168 (stating that in due
time "the EU's system of government might well be ascribed a genuine presidential
epithet.").
199. See GIOVANNI SARTORI, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL ENGINEERING 126-31
(1994); AUGUSTO BARBERA & CARLO FUSARO, IL GOVERNO DELLE DEMOCRAZIE 79 (2001);
MAURICE

DUVERGER,

INSTITUTIONS

POLITIQUES

ET DROIT

CONSTITUTIONNEL

(1978)

(comparing forms of government).
200. See Steven G. Calabresi, The Virtues of Presidential Government, 18 CONST.
COMMENT. 51, 54 (2001). But see Richard Albert, Presidential Values in Parliamentary
Democracies, 8 INT'L J. CONST. L. 207, 208 (2010) (emphasizing how parliamentary
regimes may be able to embody the virtues of presidential government).
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The virtues of a vigorous, directly legitimated and majoritarian
presidency may be particularly valuable in the European Union
today. 201 Although the European Union does not suffer from the
institutional instability characteristic of a parliamentary regimebecause the Commission is voted in office by Parliament for a term of
five years and can only be removed by it202 on the basis of a procedure
which is more reminiscent of the impeachment process in presidential
203
systems, than of the vote of no-confidence in parliamentary regimes there is growing awareness that the European Union currently lacks an
effective and legitimate executive branch. 2 4 Whereas the European
Union's responses to the Euro-crisis have been described as slow and
weak, the existence of a stronger presidency would increase the capacity
to act swiftly and with leadership in front of new challenges. 205
Moreover, whereas the EU institutions currently appear very much
remote from the EU citizens-since the mechanisms of electoral
accountability at the EU level are only indirect 206 -the existence of a
stronger presidency, directly legitimated by the citizens, would raise its
capacity to be responsive to popular concerns. 207 At the same time, while
the current proportionality-based electoral regime for the European
Parliament 208 favors party fragmentation and fosters the lack of
unifying themes in the European political debate, 209 the existence of a
monocratic office would inevitably force the emergence of a public
201. But see AREND LIJPHART, PATTERNS OF DEMOCRACY 42 (1999) (describing the EU as
the example of a consociational system, following non-majoritarian logics).
202. See TEU supra note 3, art. 17(3).
203. See Paul Magnette, Appointing and Censuring the European Commission: The
Adaptation of ParliamentaryInstitutions to the Community Context, 7 EUR. L.J. 292, 305
(2001) (emphasizing technocratic rather than the political nature of the motion of censure
by the European Parliament).
204. See supra p. 294.
205. See Sylvie Goulard, Foreword: De la d~mocratie en Europe, in WHAT FORM OF
GOVERNMENT FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE EUROZONE? v (Federico Fabbrini et al
eds., 2015).
206. But see PETER L. LINDSETH, POWER AND LEGITIMACY 22-23 (2010) (arguing that
the EU is based on a delegation of powers by the member states with the legitimacy
solidly residing in them).
207. See Laeken Declaration, SN 273/01 (Dec. 15, 2001) (stating that "the European
institutions must be brought closer to its citizens" so as to address the democratic
challenge facing the EU).
208. See Council Decision 2002/772/EC, art.l, 2002 O.J. (L 283) 1, (Euratom) (amending
the Act concerning the election of the representatives of the European Parliament by
direct universal suffrage and requiring member states to adopt proportional
representation for the elections of the European Parliament).
209. See Michel Theys, Vingt-huit scrutins nationaux pour un Parlement en constante
9volution, EGMONT ROYAL INST. FOR INT'L REL. EUR. POLY BRIEF No. 26 (2014)
(emphasizing fragmentation of European Parliament elections along national lines).
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sphere, where competition occurs around key lines of political conflict,
and would thus likely contribute to the rise of European political
210
parties.
In the institutional system of the European Union, however, the
proposal to strengthen the role of the President of the European Council
would carry additional benefits that are specific to the present situation
of the European Union. First, a reformed presidency of the European
Council, selected through an open and transparent electoral process and
accountable to EU citizens at large, would restore a healthy equality
between the EU member states. A fair balance between the member
states is crucial to a well-functioning European Union. 211 At the
moment, however, the President of the European Council is chosen by
the heads of states and government congressed in the European
Council, and is accountable exclusively to them. 212 This means that,
currently, the President is entirely dependent on the heads of states and
213
governments and enjoys limited capacity to keep them under check.
As the previous analysis underlined, Germany has acquired a
dominating influence in the working of the European Council, largely
upsetting the balance between the member states. 21 4 Were the
President of the European Council to be chosen through a popular
election instead, he could have the institutional independence to keep
the member states in check and protect the interests of the Union as a
whole.
Strictly linked to this is a second advantage of the
presidentialization of the European Council, which carries particular
value in the current state of the EU integration project: the capacity to
provide a sense of unity. It has been too often noticed how growing
fragmentation within the European Union-with the partition between
the Eurozone and the non-Eurozone member states, 21 5 increasing resort

210. See generally Ingolf Pernice, Domestic Courts, Constitutional Constraints and
European Democracy: What Solution for the Crisis?, in THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF
EUROPEAN BUDGETARY CONSTRAINTS 297, 316 (Federico Fabbrini et al. eds., 2014)
(discussing the importance of a European public sphere).
211. See generally Magnette & Nicolaidis, supra note 116 (discussing why a fair balance
is required by small and large states in the EU for it function effectively).
212. See TEU, supra note 3, art. 15(5).
213. See generally D. Nederlof et al., Editorial, The European Council and National
Executives: Segmentation, Consolidation and Legitimation, 8 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 165,
165-71 (2012).
214. See supra pp. 278-284.
215. See generally JEAN-CLAUDE PIRIS, THE FUTURE OF EUROPE: TOWARDS A TWO-SPEED

EU? (2011) (noting the fragmentation caused by the division between Eurozone and nonEurozone members, and proposing the solution of permitting two-speed development,
allowing a move toward closer economic and political union).
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to enhanced
cooperation, 216 and
the complex
patterns
of
intergovernmental agreements concluded by member states with
217
variable geometry outside the legal order of the European Union, has weakened the idea of unity of the Union. 218 Needless to say, a
complex polity like the European Union shall be pluralistic and provide
for multiple fora for representation, 219 and the right to withdrawal from
the European Union, which is currently enshrined in the EU treaties,
makes sure that no member state can be compelled to remain part of the
European Union against its will.220 Nevertheless, there is a case to be
made for the European Union to be able to increasingly speak with one
voice, both to face security challenges abroad, and to define the interests
of the European Union at home. 221 From this point of view,
strengthening the role of the President of the European Council would
offer the institutional forum through which the multiple interests at
play in the European Union could be integrated into a unitary vision.
Further, a third advantage connected with a reformed post of the
European Council President is its suitability to protect the values of
federalism (or decentralization) on which the European Union is
founded. Scholars of federalism have emphasized this point,222 but it is
worth restating here to allay the fears of those who worry that a strong
President of the European Council, representing the unity of the Union,
would make the European Union slide into the direction of a super216. See Federico Fabbrini, Enhanced Cooperation Under Scrutiny: Revisiting the Law
and Practice of Multi-Speed Integration in Light of the First Involvement of the EU
Judiciary,40 LEGAL ISSUES ECON. INTEGRATION 197, 199 (2013).
217. European Parliament Resolution of 12 December 2013 on Constitutional Problems
of a Multitier Governance in the European Union, EUR. PARL. DOC. P7_TA(2013)0598.
218. See W. Tom Eijsbouts & Monica Claes, Editorial, From Confederacy to Convoy:
Thoughts About the Finalityof the Union and its Member States, 6 EUR. CONST. L. REv. 1,
1-5 (2010).
219. See generally WALTER VAN GERVEN, THE EUROPEAN UNION: A POLITY OF STATES
AND PEOPLE (2005) (highlighting that the complex polity of EU requires it to be
pluralistic).
220. See TEU, supra note 3, art. 50.
221. See Glienicker
Group,
Towards a
Euro Union, (Oct. 18,
2013),
http://www.bruegel.org/nc/blog/detail/article/1173-towards-a-euro-union/ (stating that "[i]n
a multipolar world in which China, Russia and others expand their spheres of influence
and the global supremacy of the USA decreases, Europe ought to be able to defend her
common interests effectively"); Eiffel Group, For a Euro Community, (Feb. 14, 2014),
http://www.bruegel.orglncfblog/detail/article/1250-for-a-euro-community/
(stating that
"[e]nsuring that Europe's voice is heard is not a question of prestige, nor an idealist whim.
It is how to ensure that in the future the priorities which are important to Europe's
citizens ... are protected.").
222. See generally Bradford Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism,
79 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1321-29 (2001) (discussing separation of powers as a protection of
federalism in the U.S.).
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state. 223 In fact, an autonomously legitimated President of the European
Council can actually provide a more receptive forum to those EU
citizens who would like to scale back the degree, or speed, of EU
integration. At the moment, the EU institutional system does not
provide any supranational forum in which disgruntled EU citizens can
voice their concern against overcentralization. 224 The process of EU
integration has been characterized by a continuous trend in the
centralization of powers, 225 with the functioning of the EU bureaucracy
continuing on autopilot despite the growing disenchantment of EU
citizens. 226 An elected and accountable President of the European
Council could provide exactly such a forum and should be endowed with
the power to safeguard the federal division of competence between the
227
European Union and its member states.
Ultimately, the three advantages discussed above can be related
through the concept of representation. As the Euro-crisis has
demonstrated, the European Union lacks an executive body that can
simultaneously represent the EU member states and the EU citizens
(i.e., a union of states and citizens). 228 Each of the heads of states and
government that sits in the European Council certainly represents its
229
member state and the national constituency that elected him or her;
but he or she cannot speak for other states or citizens since these have
not elected him or her. At the same time, the current President of the

223. See generally GLYN MORGAN, THE IDEA OF A EUROPEAN SUPERSTATE: PUBLIC

JUSTIFICATION AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (2005) (making the case in favor of a superstate).
224. Compare Damian Chalmers, Democratic Self-Government in Europe: Domestic
Solutions to the EU Legitimacy Crisis, POL'Y NETWORK (May 15, 2013), www.policynetwork.net/publications download.aspx?ID=8362 (advancing a proposal to empower
national parliaments to veto and nullify EU legislation), with infra note 249 and
accompanying text (explaining that vesting veto power in national parliaments is not the
solution to police subsidiarity as national legislatures use their power for domestic
political reasons).
225. See generally KEN KOLLMAN, PERILS OF CENTRALIZATION: LESSONS FROM CHURCH,

STATE AND CORPORATION (2013) (discussing the trend of centralization in the EU).
226. See Tony Barber, Elections Results Show a Europe Short of Confidence in Its
Future, THE FIN. TIMES (London) (May, 26 2014), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/49fleab4e4d8-1 le3-9b2b-00144feabdcO.html#slide0.
227. See infra pp. 311-312.
228. See TEU, supra note 3, art. 10(1) (stating that "[t]he functioning founded on
representative democracy."); see also Armin von Bogdandy, The European Lesson for
International Democracy: The Significance of Article 9-12 EU Treaty for International
Organizations, 23 EUR. J. INT'L L. 315, 315 (2012) (explaining the significance of TEU
article 10(1) in regards to representative democracy).
229. See Wolfgang Wessels et al., Democratic Control in the Member States of the
European Council and the Euro zone Summits, report commissioned by the Constitutional
Affairs Committee of the European Parliament, PE 474.392 (Jan. 2013).
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European Council only represents the heads of state and government
who elected him, 230 but he cannot really speak for the Union as a whole,
since the EU people never voted him into office. As it is, also the
President -if the European Commission suffers from an analogous
representative deficit, even after the "new process" put in place for the
May 2014 election of the European Parliament, in which each political
party tied its electoral success with the appointment of a
Spitzenkandidat for the post of Commission President. 231 Because the
European Parliament is elected through a system of proportional
representation, the composition of the legislature reflects a high degree
of fragmentation, and no political party won a majority. 232 As a result,
the President of the European Commission was drawn from the largest
party in the European Parliament, the EPP, which only won 29 percent
of the EU-wide popular vote. In this situation, it is difficult for the
President of the European Commission to claim that he received a
233
popular mandate to represent the Union.
The disconnect between the power that the European Union has
acquired since the beginning of the Euro-crisis and the lack of adequate
mechanisms of representation is a key challenge for the Union. 234 No
democratic polity can accept the exercise of power in the absence of
adequate institutional channels of representation, through which the
people can express its voice. 235 Yet, as it was pointed out in the previous
part, the management of the Euro-crisis has deprived an increasing
number of EU states and citizens of the capacity to effectively influence
the decisions affecting them; this lack of voice has fueled an increasingly
popular discontent vis-a-vis measures, which were perceived as
illegitimate-as revealed by the electoral surge of extreme, antisystem
parties. 236 It is here that the proposal to strengthen the presidency of
the European Council, and make it directly accountable to EU citizens
at large, becomes crucial to cure the representation deficit in the EU
230. See CRAIG, supra note 151; HABERMAS, supranote 121.
231. See suprapp. 287-288.
232. See Result of the 2014 EuropeanElections, supra note 92.
233. See Joseph H.H. Weiler, Editorial, Fateful Elections? Investing in the Future of
Europe, 25 EUR. J. INT'L L. 361, 365 (2014) (stating that the selection of the Commission
President in light of the result of the election of the European Parliament "compromises
the ability in a political sense for this or that candidate to say with authority 'I was elected
by the peoples of Europe."').
234. See Simona Piattoni, Is the EU a RepresentativeDemocracy? The Normative Debate
and the Impact of the Euro-Crisis,in WHAT FORM OF GOVERNMENT FOR THE EUROPEAN
UNION AND THE EUROzONE? 133 (Federico Fabbrini et al. eds., 2015).
235. See generally Ben Crum, Saving the Euro at the Cost of Democracy?, 51 J. COMMON
MKT. STUD. 614, 614 (2013) (discussing the need for adequate institutional channels of
representation in relation to the Euro-crisis).
236. See supranotes 118-19.
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executive branch. 237 If the President of the European Council were
elected by the EU citizens, through a mechanism which (as I shall
explain below) 238 accounts for the asymmetries between the EU member

states, it could plausibly claim to represent the interest of the Union as
a whole and, therefore, be able to act in the name of Europe. This is
crucial not only because the President would eventually be able to
exercise leadership, but also because it could legitimately speak for the
EU citizens and member states, rather than for just a sub-group
thereof.

23 9

In light of the above, it is time to consider how the new powers of
the presidency should be defined. From a comparative perspective, the
diversity of constitutional regulation of the power of the executive
branch in presidential systems is remarkable. For example, the U.S.
Constitution barely defines the function of the President, 240 whereas the
French and Brazilian Constitutions provide a broad empowerment of
authority to the Head of State. 241 Most constitutions entrust the

237. See Deirdre Curtin, Democratic Accountability of EU Executive Power, in WHAT
FORM OF GOVERNMENT FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE EUROZONE? 171 (Federico
Fabbrini et al. eds., 2015) (discussing the need for institutional reforms that increase
accountability of the EU executive).
238. See infra Section V.
239. See ceteris paribusSteven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary
Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23, 23-38 (1995) (emphasizing that the presidency in the U.S.
constitutional system is the only purely national office, as opposed to the legislature,
whose members are representatives of regional, or state, constituencies).
240. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (effectively granting to the President alone only the
power to command the military, "require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer
in each of the executive Departments," grant pardons, and make recess appointmentswith all other powers being subject to Congressional approval). Of course, over the time
the effective powers of the presidency have aggrandized, especially in the field of national
security and foreign affairs. See also Ernest A. Young, Taming the Most Dangerous
Branch: The Scope and Accountability of Executive Power in the United States, in THE
EXECUTIVE AND PUBLIC LAw 161 (Paul Craig & Adam Tomkins eds., 2006). But see NLRB
v. Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014) (restricting the power of the President to make recess
appointments even when the Senate is convened only in pro-forma sessions).
241. CONSTITUIVAo FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 84 (Braz.) (empowering the
President, inter alia, to appoint and dismiss ministers of state, run the administration,
initiate legislation, veto bills, conclude national treaties, declare a state of siege and
emergency, command the military, grant pardons, submit to Congress the pluriannual
plan and the budget, and issue provisional measures with the force of law); 1958 CONST.
arts. 5-19 (Fr.) (charging the President of the Republic with guaranteeing the functioning
of the public power, the continuity of the state, and national independence; and
empowering him to appoint the Prime Minister, preside over the Council of Ministers, veto
bills, call for a national referendum, dissolve the assembly, command the military, grant
pardons, and exercise emergency powers when the independence of the nation is
threatened).
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command of the military to the presidency, 242 but this is not something
that concerns the European Union 243 (although one may be left
wondering how long the Union can expect to go forward without an
adequate security and defense policy, in light of rising threats, not only
globally, but also regionally). 244 In the framework of the European
Union, it seems that a treaty reform strengthening the power of the
President of the European Council should at least award to the
presidency the following new powers. First, the President of the
European Council should appoint the members of the Commission,
which would be subject to the vote of consent of the European
Parliament. The Commission is an institution with very professional
and qualified technical know-how to administer policy decisions.
Therefore, it would be unreasonable to duplicate the task of the
Commission by establishing a new administration within the presidency
of the European Council. Nevertheless, action by the Commission is
increasingly in need of democratic legitimation. 245 By virtue of its
popular, EU-wide election, the President of the European Council would
be able to secure such a legitimation to the EU administration, but
should in turn be able to shape the apex of the Commission and thus
246
implement its policy agenda through the EU bureaucracy.
Second, the President of the European Council should be
empowered to veto legislation adopted by the European Parliament and
the Council, subject to the possibility for the EU legislature (Parliament
plus Council) to override the veto with a supermajority of the votes cast.
This authority would entrench the ability of the presidency to also act
for the protection of the EU federal compact. In fact, as experience has
demonstrated, the European Union currently lacks an institution that

242. See, e.g., LouIs FISCHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 12-16 (2d ed. rev. 2004)
(outlining the origin and development of the U.S. President's role as commander in chief of
the U.S. armed forces); Bernard Chantebout, La dissuasion nucldaire et le pouvoir
prdsidentiel, 38 POUVOIRS 21 (1986) (discussing the powers of France's president,
specifically the power to engage in nuclear deterrence).
243. See TEU, supra note 3, art. 4(2) (stating that "national security remains the sole
responsibility of each Member State").
244. For an accounting of the costs occasioned by the lack of a single EU security and
defense policy, see generally VALERIO BRIANI, The Costs of Non-Europe in the Defence
Field, (Ctr. for Studies on Federalism & Instituto Affari Internazionali Paper 2013),
available at http://www.iai.it/sites/defaultdfiles/CSF-LAJInoneuropedefence april20l3.pdf.
245. See Damian Chalmers, The European Redistributive State and a European Law of
Struggle, 18 EUR. L.J. 667, 686-692 (2012) (stressing the importance of legitimizing
actions by the Commission in light of its increasing powers).
246. See ceteris paribus STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE:
LEADERSHIP FROM JOHN ADAMS TO BILL CLINTON (1997) (giving a historical account of the
power of the U.S. presidency to shape U.S. politics through the administration).
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can effectively police the principle of subsidiarity. 247 While the
Commission and the European Court of Justice have a pro-European
bias, the European Parliament and the Council also have an interest in
adopting EU legislation to expand their competence. 248 Protocol No. 2 to
the EU treaties sought to enlist national parliaments as watchdogs of
subsidiarity, but practice has shown that national legislatures have
abused their role, mostly for petty domestic politics.

2 49

On the contrary,

a reformed President of the European Council could be more sensitive to
subsidiarity: the expansion of EU legislation would not necessarily
aggrandize the presidency, and its subjection to direct popular election
would make it prone to exercise veto against EU legislation that
250
encroaches on the powers of the states.
Instead, the new EU presidency should not be empowered to
dissolve the European Parliament. In the current EU system of
government, the European Council and the European Parliament are
25 1
strictly separated. This institutional solution should be maintained.
While a President of the European Council elected by the EU citizens in
the EU member states would obviously hold great authority, the
separation between the executive and the legislature provides an

247. See TEU, supra note 3, art. 5(3) ("[I]n areas which do not fall within its exclusive
competence, the Union shall act only if and insofar as the objectives of the proposed action
cannot be sufficiently achieved by the member states, either at central level or at regional
and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be
better achieved at Union level."); see generally Federico Fabbrini, The Principle of
Subsidiarity, in OXFORD PRINCIPLES OF EU LAW (Takis Tridimas & Robert Schiitze eds.,
forthcoming 2015) (providing a legal analysis of the concept of subsidiarity, exploring its
philosophical foundations, and analyzing the particular institutional mechanisms used to
secure it).
248. See supra p. 308 (discussing the continuing centralization of EU power).
249. Federico Fabbrini & Katarzyna Granat, "Yellow Card, But No Foul" The Role of
the National Parliaments Under the Subsidiarity Protocol and the Commission Proposal
for an EU Regulation on the Right to Strike, 50 COMM. MKT. L. REV. 115, 121-25 (2013)
(arguing that vesting veto power in national parliaments is not an effective means to
police subsidiarity, because, among other reasons, national legislatures use their power
for domestic political reasons).
250. Comparative analysis furnishes cautionary tales in this regard. In the United
States, for instance, presidents have often fostered centralization of power. See KOLLMAN,
supra note 225; But see also Andrew Jackson, Veto Message to the Senate, July 10, 1832, in
A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1139-54, available at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th-century/ajvetoO1.asp
(vetoing the bill renewing the
charter of the Second Bank of the United States because "modifications of the existing
charter proposed by this act are not such, in my view, as make it consistent with the
rights of the States or the liberties of the people.").
251. On the separation of powers, see supra p. 303. On the impeachment of the
executive, see infra p. 321.
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important wall against potential abuses by the presidency. 252 Moreover,
the presidency should not be endowed with any emergency power. As
the comparative experience of South American political regimes
demonstrate, in presidential systems in which the legislature is elected
through proportional representation, presidents can abuse emergency
power when they want to overcome deadlock in the legislature. 253 This is
one of the vices of presidential government that an enlightened reform
of the EU system of governance should obviously avoid by restricting
the power of the presidency to act within the constitutional framework.
On the other hand, I suggest that the term of office of the President
should be changed to five years, 254 renewable once, thus ensuring that
the presidency can have a sufficiently broad timeframe of action to carry
forward its agenda.
V. ASYMMETRIES AND ELECTION
A central question in the proposal to strengthen the presidency of
the European Council concerns the mode of its election. This point does
not constitute a simple technical feature, but rather raises one of the
key constitutional challenges in the process of institutional design of a
reformed presidency. 255 The reason has to do with the profound
asymmetry that characterizes the EU member states in terms of
population size. As it is well known, the European Union features
member states that range in population from Germany, with almost
eighty-two million citizens, to Malta, with just over 400,000
inhabitants. 256 Moreover, 53.5 percent of the 507 million EU citizens
live in just four EU member states: Germany, France, the United
Kingdom, and Italy; the remaining 46.5 percent is scattered across the
other twenty-four member states. This remarkable difference between
the population of large and small states defies any easy option for a
simple, Europe-wide election of the President of the European Council.
Inevitably, such an electoral system would render meaningless the
value of voting in the smaller member states, making the election of the
President of the European Council a matter exclusively for the larger
252. See Neal Katyal, Internal Separationof Powers: Checking Today's Most Dangerous
Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314 (2006) (characterizing the U.S. executive as the
most dangerous branch of the U.S. government today).
253. See generally THE FAILURE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY: THE CASE OF LATIN

AMERICA, VOLUME 2 (Juan Linz & Arturo Valenzuela eds., 1994).
254. This would make the length of the presidential term correspond to the length of the
parliamentary term. See suprap. 298.
255. See generally COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN (Tom Ginsburg ed., 2014)
(describing institutional choices in constitution-making).
256. EUROSTAT, supra note 28.

INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 22:2

member states. 257 Incidentally, as explained above, this is exactly the
problem associated with the proposal to strengthen the President of the
European Commission along the logic where a parliamentary majority
selects the chief executive. 258 Such a solution should not be acceptable
considering that the proposal to strengthen the presidency of the
European Council is primarily geared toward reestablishing a balance
259
between the member states.
However, the challenge that the European Union is facing is not
unique. Most federal systems characterized by uneven geographical
units and population imbalances have faced the analogous problem of
how to reconcile the desire for shared rule with the need to reassure the
smaller member states that their interest will not be unduly sacrificed
in the union. 260 As such, comparative studies provide a wealth of insight
that can be taken into account when thinking about EU institutional
reform. 261 For example, to deal with this problem, Switzerland
historically developed the principle of double-majority: 262 while
Switzerland does not have a monocratic executive, 263 popular referenda,
which are a pervasive feature of Swiss politics, 264 require for approval
both a majority of the Swiss population and a majority of the
Cantons. 265 The logic of the double majority has been readapted with the
specific aim to select a monocratic chief executive in Indonesia, which is
a federalizing system with a presidential regime. Pursuant to the
Indonesian Constitution, as amended in 2001 in the complex transition

257. See generally Fabbrini, supranote 20.
258. See supra pp. 295-96.
259. See supra p. 306.
260. See DANIEL J. ELAZAR, EXPLORING FEDERALISM 5 (1987) (stating that federalism
involves "the combination of self-rule and shared rule.").
261. See generally FEDERAL DEMOCRACIES (Michael Burgess & Alain Gagnon eds., 2010)
(describing comparative approaches to creating democracy in federal systems and what
may be gleaned from them).
262. Wolf Linder & Adrian Vatter, Institutions and Outcomes of Swiss Federalism: The
Role of Cantons in Swiss Politics, in THE SWISS LABYRINTH 95, 97-99 (Jan-Erik Lane ed.,
2001).
263. See BUNDESVERFASSUNG [BV] [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 18, 1999, SR 101, arts. 174-79
(Switz.) (stating that the seven-member Directorate is elected by the Federal Parliament
for a fixed term of four years, and cannot be removed by Parliament). See also HANSPETER
KRIESI & ALEXANDER H. TRECHSEL, THE POLITICS OF SWITZERLAND: CONTINUITY AND
CHANGE IN A CONSENSUS DEMOCRACY (2008) (explaining that the members of the

Directorates are elected on the basis of a rigid formula reflecting the consociational nature
of the Swiss system).
264. See Max Frenkel, The Communal Basis of Swiss Liberty, 23 PUBLIUS 61, 67 (1993).
265.

See BUNDESVERFASSUNG

(Switz.).

[BV] [CONSTITUTION]

Apr. 18, 1999, SR 101, art. 142
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toward democracy, 266 a winning presidential candidate must receive a
majority of the popular vote nationwide and at least 20 percent of the
267
vote in a majority of the provinces.
Perhaps the most well-known example of a creative institutional
mechanism designed to account for the asymmetries between large and
small states in the election of a chief executive is the electoral college of
the U.S. Constitution. 268 As Shlomo Slonim has explained, in the late
eighteenth century the majority of the U.S. states provided for the
election of the executive by the legislature, 269 or by direct popular
suffrage. 270 Yet, to the Framers of the U.S. Constitution, neither of these
solutions appeared consistent with the objective to secure a separation
of powers between the executive and the legislature, as well as to
overcome the cleavage between the small and large states, which
influenced the entire work of the Philadelphia Convention. 271 Hence, the
272
Framers came up with something entirely new: the Electoral College.
Pursuant to this system, the President of the United States is not
elected directly by the people, but rather he is elected by special electors
appointed by-in fact, since the nineteenth century, elected in-the
states and constituting together an ad hoc College.27 3 Each state is
entitled to a number of electors equal to the sum of representatives and
senators that the state possesses in Congress. 274 Because, pursuant to
the Great Compromise, the U.S. Constitution awards every state two
senators 275 and at least one representative, 276 (regardless of population),
266. See James Giggacher, Stand-Off as Indonesia Treads New Democratic Path, THE
CANBERRA TIMES (July 11, 2014) (discussing contested presidential election in 2014).
267. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA, Aug. 11, 2002, art. 6A.
268. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE. VOLUME 1: FOUNDATIONS 68 (1991).

269. "Election of the executive by the legislature was provided for under the
constitutions of Delaware, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina and Virginia." Shlomo Slonim, The Electoral College at Philadelphia:The
Evolution of an Ad Hoc Congress for the Selection of a President,73 J. AM. HIST. 35, 37 n.6
(1986).
270. "Popular election of the executive was provided for under the constitutions of
Massachusetts, New Hampshire and New York." Id.
271. For the importance of separation of powers to the Framers of the U.S. Constitution,
see RAY RAPHAEL, MR. PRESIDENT: How AND WHY THE FOUNDERS CREATED A CHIEF
EXECUTIVE 79-80 (2012); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC:

1776-1787, at 547-53 (1993). For the centrality of the division between large and small
states, see RAPHAEL, supra,at 108-09; WOOD, supra,at 558-59.
272. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cls. 2-3, (establishing the Electoral College).
273. See generally L. PAIGE WHITAKER & THOMAS H. NEALE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RL30804, THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE: AN OVERVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF REFORM PROPOSALS

1-5 (2001) (providing an overview of the history and current functioning of the electoral
college).
274. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
275. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1.
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the Electoral College secures a slight overrepresentation of the small
states in the election of the U.S. President. 277 Hence, whereas the
electoral system follows a majoritarian logic (because a candidate must
win a majority of the Electoral College votes to be elected President),
"the deviation from population apportionment of the electoral college is
278
justified in order to serve federalism."
Needless to say, the Electoral College system has received frequent
criticism, being the feature of the U.S. Constitution that has been the
target of the greatest number of proposed constitutional amendments. 279
To begin, as Bruce Ackerman has explained, 280 the Framers of the U.S.
Constitution utterly failed to anticipate the rise of presidential
democracy and were ingenuous in writing several technical
characteristics of the mechanics of the Electoral College. In particular,
the Framers envisioned that in the absence of a majority winner in the
Electoral College, the election of the President would be thrown to the
House of Representatives, where votes would be cast by states (the
representation of each state having one vote).281 In the election of 1800,
just thirteen years after the adoption of the U.S. Constitution, this
resulted in a major constitutional crisis, only haphazardly solved with
the election of President Jefferson 282 and the subsequent adoption of the
Twelfth Amendment. 28 3 Moreover, the functioning of the Electoral
College has continued to raise objections in the present day mainly
276. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
277. See RAPHAEL, supra note 271, at 109.
278. Norman R. Williams, Reforming the Electoral College: Federalism, Majoritarianism
and the Perils of SubconstitutionalChange, 100 GEO. L.J. 173, 192 (2011).
279. See Slonim, supra note 269, at 35 (reporting that "[c]lose to seven hundred
proposals to amend the Electoral College scheme have been introduced into Congress
since the Constitution was inaugurated."); Williams, supra note 278, at 175 (stating that
"[i]n the past two centuries, more proposed constitutional amendments have sought to
replace or reform the Electoral College than any other feature of [the U.S.] constitutional
order.").
280. See BRUcE AcKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS: JEFFERSON,
MARSHALL AND THE RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY 5 (2005) (detailing the electoral
college crisis of 1800).
281. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3.
282. See ACKERMAN, supra note 268, at 104-107 (recalling the popular victory of
Thomas Jefferson and his Republican Party in the elections of 1800 but explaining that
the electors, due to technical failures in the Electoral College scheme, cast the same
number of ballots to Jefferson and his running mate, Aaron Burr, which deprived the
former of the Electoral College majority and threw the election to the House of
Representatives, which, voting by states, eventually awarded the presidency to Jefferson
only after thirty-six inconclusive ballots).
283. See U.S. CONST., amend. XII (modifying the rules on the functioning of the
Electoral College so that the electors separately vote for the president and the vice
president).
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because of the possibility that a candidate could become President of the
United States by winning the votes of the Electoral College while losing
the national popular vote, 284 an issue which was recently revived in the
contested election of 2000.285 As a result of the weaknesses of the U.S.
Electoral College system, which are objects of ongoing proposals for
reform, including through an interstate compact, 28 6 it would be
unreasonable to advocate its establishment in the European Union for
the potential election of the President of the European Council.
However, even if the institution of the Electoral College should not
be replicated in Europe, there is one lesson that the system can offer to
the European Union: an innovative mechanism to count votes to
overcome the asymmetries between the member states in the election of
the President. This is achieved by entitling every state to a number of
votes corresponding to the sum of votes it enjoys in the two branches of
the legislature. The European Union has a bicameral legislature: the
European Parliament, which represents the citizens, and the Council,
which represents the states. 287 In the European Parliament, the 751
seats are apportioned on the basis of population, albeit corrected by the
principle of degressive proportionality. 28 8 As provided by Article 14(2) of
the TEU, no member state shall be allocated more than ninety-six seats,
and no state shall have less than six. In the Council, until November
2014,289 votes were weighted between the member states based on their
size, but with greater equality in the apportionment between states
than in the European Parliament. 290 In particular, since the accession of
Croatia to the European Union in July 2013,291 the Council has 352
votes, which are divided between the twenty-eight member states along
a ratio, which ranges from twenty-nine votes (for Germany, France,
284. See SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 87 (2006).

285. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (halting recount of votes in Florida and de
facto awarding the presidency to George W. Bush); see also BUSH v. GORE: THE QUESTION
OF LEGITIMACY (Bruce Ackerman ed., 2002) (analyzing various legal aspects of the 2000
election).
286. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 3 (authorizing states to enter into compacts with
the consent of Congress); see also Akhil Amar & Vikram Amar, How to Achieve Direct
National Election of the President Without Amending the Constitution,FINDLAW (Dec. 28,
2001), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/amar/20011228.html; National PopularVote Compact,
NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE, http://www.nationalpopularvote.com (last visited Aug. 9, 2014)
(proposing to award the Electoral College votes to the candidate who wins a majority of
the national popular vote).
287. See VAN GERVEN, supra note 219, at 332.
288. See TEU, supranote 3, art. 14(2).
289. See infra p. 320.
290. See TEU, supra note 3, art. 16(4).
291. Treaty Concerning the Accession of the Republic of Croatia to the European Union,
Nov. 7, 2011, 2012 O.J. (L 112) 10.
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Italy, and the United Kingdom) to three votes for Malta. 292 In other
words, contrary to the United States, which has one chamber of the
legislature (the House) mainly reflecting states' population and one
chamber (the Senate) purely enshrining the equality of the states, the
European Union is endowed with a bicameral system which
incorporates a logic of degressive proportionality in both chambers. Yet,
the result is the same: namely to temper majoritarianism to safeguard
federalism. This is highly valuable for the purpose of electing the
President of the European Council.
My proposal for the mode of election would be the following. Every
five years, on the same day EU citizens vote for the European
Parliament, they also elect the President of the European Council.
Political parties bring forward candidates for the post (possibly through
a popular selection process via primaries elections). 293 Citizens directly
vote for the President so there is no special, intermediate electoral body
such as the U.S. Electoral College. However, the election of the
President is not made on the basis of an EU-wide constituency. Rather,
as is the case for the election of the European Parliament, citizens vote
in state constituencies. Moreover, (like in the United States) every EU
member state is awarded a number of "votes" for the election of the
President of the European Council, which equals the number of seats
that state has in the European Parliament plus the number of votes
that state has in the Council. The candidate that comes first in one state
would gain all the "electoral votes" of that state (following the logic of
the winner takes all). To be elected President of the European Council, a
candidate must obtain the majority of "electoral votes" across the
European Union: since the European Parliament has 751 seats and the
Council 352 votes, the total number of presidential votes is the sum of
751 and 352, which equals 1,103: so the magic number a candidate must
reach to be elected is 1,103 divided by two, which equals 552. If none of
the candidates reaches the majority of 552 votes, the two candidates
with the highest number of electoral votes will be subject to a runoff
fourteen days after the first election. The candidate who gains a
majority of electoral votes will become President of the European
Council.
292. See Protocol No. 36 on Transitional Provisions, art. 3(3), 2012 O.J. (C 326) 323,
amended by Treaty Concerning the Accession of the Republic of Croatia to the European

Union, Nov. 7, 2011, 2012 O.J. (L 112) 20.
293. This is an important point that I cannot develop in full here. But see ceteris paribus
Sonia Piedrafita & Vilde Renman, The "Personalisation'
of the European Elections: A Halfhearted Attempt to Increase Turnout and Democratic Legitimacy?, 37 EUR. POL'Y INST.
NETWORK 1, 5 (2014) (raising concerns on the process which has been followed by some
European political parties to select the Spitzenkandidaten for the post of Commission
President and demanding a more open and transparent process in the future).
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The electoral mechanism proposed here, while being inspired by the
trials and errors of regimes abroad, 294 presents several distinctive
advantages. Like the U.S. precedent, 295 it devises a way to count votes,
which ensures (through the trick of the "electoral votes") a slight
overrepresentation of smaller member states in the selection of the
President of the European Council. This addresses the dire problem of
asymmetry between large and small states that characterizes the
European Union. However, unlike the United States, it removes the
filter of an ad hoc electoral body, the Electoral College: whereas the
Framers of the U.S. Constitution, with their distrust for radical
democracy, 296 were afraid of a direct, popular legitimation of the
executive, this issue seems less of a problem today. Moreover, the option
proposed above introduces a runoff mechanism, which has two
advantages. First, it allows every political party to present a candidate
in the first round of election (which is consistent with the mode of direct
election of heads of states in EU member states with semipresidential
systems, 297 and conforms to the logic of proportional representation
which is in place for the multi-party European Parliament). 298 Yet-and
this is the second advantage-it also secures through the runoff that the
President of the European Council will be elected by a majority (rather
than simply a plurality).299 As the recent experience of the selection of
the President of the European Commission demonstrates, the lead
candidate of a party, which represents a plurality in the European
Parliament, but only has 29 percent of the EU-wide popular votes,
suffers from a legitimacy deficit. 30 0 Instead, an electoral mechanism,
which secures majority election, (at the latest in the runoff) would boost

294. See generally Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law,
108 YALE L.J. 1225 (1999) (discussing the role of comparative law in designing
constitutional solutions).
295. See Williams, supra note 278, at 192.
296. See WOOD, supra note 271, at 322.
297. See 1958 CONST. art. 7 (Fr.) (stating that the President of the Republic is elected by
absolute majority and if that no candidate obtains this majority in the first ballot, a runoff is arranged between the two most voted candidates after fourteen days); see also
CONSTITUTION OF POLAND, art. 127(4) (P1.) (same rules).
298. See Lori Thorlakson, Federalismand the EuropeanParty System, 12 J. EUR. PUB.
POL'Y 468, 468-70 (2005) (discussing the application of a framework from comparative
federalism to the European party system).
299. Note that in the functioning of the U.S. Electoral College there is the possibility
that no candidate reaches a majority of the Electoral College votes. In this case, the
election decision is thrown to the House of Representatives. This happened twice in U.S.
history: in 1800 and 1824. See LAWRENCE D. LONGLEY & NEIL R. PEIRCE, THE ELECTORAL

COLLEGE PRIMER 118 (1996); see also ACKERMAN, supra note 268, at 104-07.
300. See supra p. 307 and note 233.
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the claim of the President of the European Council to speak for the
30 1
European Union as a whole.
With that said, however, I am also aware that my proposal has
weaknesses. By trading in a purely majoritarian logic to guard the
federal balance between the states, the proposal outlined above
disappoints those who would like to see a President directly elected
30 2
through an EU-wide popular election in which states have no role.
Moreover, the proposal partially builds on the allocation of votes
between the member states in the Council traditionally provided for in
the EU treaties, and which the Lisbon Treaty has extended on a
temporary basis. 30 3 However, such a system has been the object of
criticism because it significantly distorts the weights of the states by
securing a major overrepresentation of middle size EU member states,
at the expenses of both larger and smaller ones. 304 In particular,
following the revisions introduced by the Nice Treaty of 2001, Spain and
Poland gained as many as twenty-seven votes, only two votes less than
Germany (which has twenty-nine votes), despite the fact that these
states have respectively 56 percent and 46 percent of the population of
Germany. It is also for this reason that the Lisbon Treaty, after a
transitional period ending in November 2014, and extendable until
March 2017,305 has replaced the current weighing of votes between
30 6
states in the Council with a Swiss-like "double majority" principle.
Pursuant to Article 16(4) of the TEU, after the end of the transitional
period "a qualified majority shall be defined as at least 55 percent of the
members of the Council, comprising at least fifteen of them and
representing member states comprising at least 65 percent of the
population of the Union." Resorting to the weighing of votes in the
Council is of course a limit of the proposal. One could think ways to

301. On the connection between electoral mechanisms and government stability, see
SARTORI, supranote 199, at 27.
302. For the proposal for the direct election of the president of the European
Commission, see Decker & Sonnicksen, supra note 182, at 30.
303. See TEU, supra note 3, art. 16(5); see also Protocol No. 36 on Transitional
Provisions, art. 3(3), 2012 O.J. (C 326) 323.
304. See Bela PlechanovovA, The Treaty of Nice and the Distributionof the Votes in the
Council - Voting Power Consequencesfor the EU after the Oncoming Enlargement, 7 EUR.
INTEGRATION ONLINE PAPERS 1 (2003), http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2003-006a.htm.
305. See TEU, supra note 3, art. 16.
306. See Frank Hage, The Lisbon Treaty's Change to Council Voting Rules Will Have
Important Implications for the Democratic Legitimacy of the EU, LONDON SCHOOL
EcONOMIcs BLOG (Feb. 3, 2014), http://blogs.lse.ac.UKeuroppblog/2014O2/O3/the-lisbontreatys-change-to-council-voting-rules-will-have-importantimplicatins-for-thedemocratic-legitimacy-of-the-eu.
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reapportion the numbers for the future, but for the moment I have
307
taken what was available and built on it.
Finally-and perhaps more importantly-the proposal to directly
elect the President of the European Council deprives the heads of states
and government congressed in the European Council of one of their

greatest privileges: electing the President.308 At the same time, if the
election of the President is taken away from the European Council, it is
advisable that the power to impeach and remove the President in case of
grave misbehaviors be removed from the European Council and
attributed to the EU legislature, as a way to secure separation of powers
and interinstitutional checks and balances. 30 9 As I have explained
above, the whole logic of taking the election of the President of the
European Council out of the hands of the heads of states and
government in the European Council is motivated by the desire to
endow the presidency of greater power and legitimacy, to prevent
dynamics of interstate dominations, and to create a forum in which
alternative policy agenda for the future of the European Union can
genuinely compete.3 10 However, it is clear that for a proposal of the
direct election of the President of the European Council to succeed,
sweeteners should be conceived to compensate the heads of state and
government in European Council for the loss of their privilege. 311 This
leads to the next challenge: whether an institutional reform introducing
the election of the European Council President would be feasible and
what bargaining chips could be considered to make it happen.
VI. UNANIMITY, CONSENSUS, AND COMPROMISE

In this article, I have made the case in favor of strengthening the
role of the President of the European Council as a way to address the
dynamic of interstate domination unleashed by the Euro-crisis and
revealed by the policy of austerity. In the previous parts, I have
307. An alternative option would be to work around the "double majority" system, as
foreseen in Indonesia. See supra p. 315.
308. Alternatively see SERGIO FABBRINI, supra note 144 (proposing an electoral system
in which the European Council identifies two candidates, which are then subject to a vote
by an electoral college composed of members of national parliaments. This solution would
keep the European Council at the helm of the choice of the President but may not remove
the problem of interstate domination that has so far characterized the working of the
European Council.).
309. See ceterisparibusMICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS: A
CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS xi-xii (2d ed. 2000) (emphasizing connection
between the impeachment process and separation of powers).
310. See supra Part III.
311. See CRAIG, supra note 151, at 109.
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envisioned the powers and responsibilities of a new presidency and
suggested an electoral mechanism through which the member states
and EU citizens could select the President. Now, a pressing question
that must be addressed is whether anything that I have argued for has
any, even remote, chance of being considered as an option for
institutional reform. As scholars, it is possible to fantasize about major
constitutional models, and libraries are filled with perfectly designed
312
I
charters of government that no policy maker has ever considered.
will never deny that this is a noble and important task. However, I
submit that the interest of my proposal for institutional reform
increases to the extent to which it stands a chance of being considered
as a feasible option by policy makers. This part attempts to do this. Yet,
as a starter it is hard to deny a rocky problem: the challenge of
unanimity. Crudely put, the proposal to strengthen the presidency of
the European Council would require a change of the EU Treaties and no
such change can be made unless the EU member states unanimously
313
concur.
However, as much as the process of treaty change in the European
Union is a burdensome task, it is not as burdensome as changing the
U.S. Constitution. 314 During the last twenty-two years, the EU treaties
have been subject to four major overhauls (excluding the failed attempt
to adopt a Treaty Establishing the European Constitution). 3 15 The
Treaty of Maastricht of 1992, the Treaty of Amsterdam of 1996, the
Treaty of Nice of 2001, and the Treaty of Lisbon of 2007 have all
introduced profound changes to the architecture of the European
Union-leading Bruno de Witte to speak of a "semi-permanent treaty
revision process" in the European Union. 316 Moreover, whereas the
Treaty of Lisbon was initially described as the last effort by the EU
member states to change the constitutional system of the European
312. See, e.g., the fascinating essay by MELCHIORRE GIoIA, QUALE DEI GOVERNI LIBERI
MEGLIO CONVENGA ALLA FELICITA DELL'ITALIA (1797) (outlining a constitutional model for

the form of government of Italy in 1797). Italy was established as a state only sixty-four
years later, in 1861. Interestingly, as explained by AUGUSTO BARBERA, LE BASI
FILOSOFICHE DEL COSTITUZIONALIsMO 22 (1997), the essay by Melchiorre Gioia was
drafted for a public competition promoted by the government of Lombardy, before the
region was conquered by Napoleon and made by the French authorities part of a newly
created puppet state: the Cisalpine Republic.
313. See TEU, supra note 3, art. 48.
314. See Michael B. Rappaport, Reforming Article V: The Problems Created by the
National Convention Method and How to Fix Them, 96 VA. L. REV. 1509 (2010) (explaining
the quasi-impossibility of changing the U.S. Constitution).
315. See GIUSEPPE FLORIDIA, IL CANTIERE DELLA NUOVA EUROPA 400 (2003).

316. Bruno De Witte, The Closest Thing to a ConstitutionalConversation in Europe: The
Semi-Permanent Treaty Revision Process, in CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE IN
EUROPEAN PUBLIC LAW 39, 39 (Neil Walker et al. eds., 2002).
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Union in a generation, 317 the ink of that treaty text was barely dried
when the member state exploited the newly introduced "simplified
treaty revision procedure"3 18 to rewrite Article 136 of the TFEU and
allow for the establishment of a permanent stability mechanism for the
Eurozone-the European Stability Mechanism (ESM).319
Otherwise, as several scholars have underlined, one of the recurrent
features of the responses to the Euro-crisis has been the determination
of the EU member states, especially of the (now) nineteen Eurozone
member states, to adopt international treaties outside the EU legal
320
order but functionally and substantially connected to EU law.
Whether such action was motivated by real legal arguments (such as
the lack of legal basis to act within the EU treaties) 3 21 or rather by
pragmatic concerns (such as the willingness of the majority of the EU
member states to sidestep the veto against EU treaty reform by a
minority of states, 322 or the willingness of some member states to bypass
323
the prerogative of the European Parliament in the legislative realm),
the widespread use of international treaties by the EU member states
during the last four years testifies to the existence of a political will
among the EU member states' government to engage in treaty making

317. See Jean Francois-Poncet, Rapport dinformationfait au nom de la Commission des
Affaires jtrang~res, de la ddfense et des forces armdes sur le Traitj de Lisbonnre
[Informational Report on the Lisbon Treaty on behalf of the Commission on Foreign
Affairs, the Defense and Armed Forces], at 14 (Jan. 30, 2008) (explaining difficulties in
moving ahead with the Lisbon Treaty, after the 6chec of the Constitutional Treaty).
318. See TEU, supra note 3, art. 48(6) (which allows the European Council to adopt a
unanimous decision amending all or part of the provisions of Part III of the TFEU-except
a decision expanding the competences of the EU-subject to consultation of the European
Parliament and the European Commission and approval by every member state in
accordance with its domestic constitutional requirement).
319. See European Council Decision 199/2011, art. 1, 2011 O.J. (L 91) 2 (EU) (amending
TFEU Article 136 with regard to a stability mechanism for member states whose currency
is the euro).
320. See generally KAARLO TUORI & KLAUS TUORI, THE EUROZONE CRISIS: A
CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS (2014). See also Fredric Allemand & Francesco Martucci, La
nouvelle gouvernance 9conomique europdene, in 17 CAHIERS DE DROIT IkUROPtEN 409
(2012).
321. See TEU, supra note 3, art. 5 (stating that the competences of the Union "are
governed by the principle of conferral").
322. See Bruno De Witte, Using InternationalLaw in the Euro Crisis (Univ. of Oslo Ctr.
for Eur. Stud., Arena Working Paper No. 4, 2013) (explaining adoption of the Fiscal
Compact via international law as a way to side-step the U.K. veto).
323. See generally Federico Fabbrini, On Banks, Courts and InternationalLaw: The
IntergovernmentalAgreement on the Single Resolution Fund in Context, 21 MAASTRICHT J.
EUR. & COMP. L. 444 (2014) (criticizing the adoption of the Agreement on the Single
Resolution Fund as a circumvention of the legislative powers of the European
Parliament).
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to reform the EMU. 324 Although most of the measures adopted by the
EU member states via international treaties could arguably be adopted
within the EU legal order, 325 both the Fiscal Compact (signed in March
2012 by twenty-five EU member states and now ratified by all of themexcept the United Kingdom), 326 the ESM Treaty (concluded in March
2012 by the Eurozone member states), 327 and now the Agreement on the
Transfer and Mutualisation of the Contributions to the Single
Resolution Fund (signed in May 2014 by all the member states-except
the United Kingdom and Sweden), 328 have introduced relevant reforms
329
to the EMU.
Furthermore, the Fiscal Compact (and now also the Agreement on
the Single Resolution Fund)330 includes a provision, which may be of
particular relevance to the purpose of our discussion. Under the
pressure of the delegates of the European Parliament, who joined as
observers to the negotiation about the treaty, despite not being involved
331
in drafting it,
the participating member states accepted to insert a
final clause in the Fiscal Compact, which reads that
within five years, at most, of the date of entry into force
of this Treaty, on the basis of an assessment of the

324. See Bruno Waterfield, Angela Merkel Pushes for EU Treaty Change, THE
TELEGRAPH (Brussels) (Oct. 22, 2013), http://www.telegraph.co.UK/news/worldnews/
(reporting calls by
europe/eu110397512/Angela-Merkel-pushes-for-EU-treaty-change.html
German Chancellor Merkel to revise the EU Treaties to put the Eurozone on more stable
grounds).
325. See Angelos Dimopoulos, The Use of InternationalLaw as a Tool for Enhancing
Governance in the Eurozone and its Impact on EU Institutional Integrity, in THE
CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF EUROPEAN BUDGETARY CONSTRAINTS 41, 45-49 (Federico
Fabbrini et al. eds., 2014).
326. See Treaty on the Stability, Coordination and Governance of the Economic and
Monetary Union, Mar. 2, 2012, [hereinafter TSCG], available at http://europeancouncil.europa.eu/media/639235/stOOtscg26_en 12.pdf.
327. See Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism, Feb. 2, 2012, available
at http://www.european-council.europa.eu~media/582311/O5-tesm2.en12.pdf.
328. See Agreement on the Transfer and Mutualisation of Contributions to the Single
Resolution Fund, May 21, 2014, [hereinafter Agreement SRF], available at
http://register.consilium.europa.eu doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%208457%202014%201NIT.
329. See generally ALICIA HINAREJOS, THE EURO AREA CRISIS IN CONSTITUTIONAL
PERSPECTIVE (2015) (examining the issues surrounding the crisis and the legal responses
to it).
330. See Agreement SRF, supra note 328, art. 16.
331. See Press Release, European Parliament, Fiscal Union: EP Representatives
at
Optimistic"
1
(Jan.
26,
2012),
available
"Cautiously
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdfs/news/expert/infopress/20120116IPR35406/20120116IP
R35406_en.pdf (reporting role of European Parliament negotiators in influencing the
drafting of the Fiscal Compact).
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experience with its implementation, the necessary steps
shall be taken, in accordance with the Treaty on the
European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union, with the aim of incorporating the
substance of this Treaty into the legal framework of the
332
European Union.
The Fiscal Compact introduces an obligation for the EU member
states that signed the treaty to find ways to bring back the content of
333
the treaty into the law of the European Union by January 1, 2018.
Because of the nature of (some of) the legal innovations set by the Fiscal
Compact, this implies the necessity to amend the TEU and the TFEU,
thus creating a window of opportunity in which the institutional
proposal advanced in this article could be seriously taken into
334
consideration.
In fact, whereas the key provision of the Fiscal Compact-the
obligation for the member states to introduce a "golden rule" that is a
balanced budget rule in their domestic constitutions 335-would not
require a treaty change since it could be adopted through an EU
regulation, 336 there are other provisions which are not consistent with
the EU treaties as they currently stand. One of these is the so-called
"reversed qualified majority" rule, 33 7 pursuant to which the member
states in Council commit to approve a decision by the Commission
finding a member state in breach of the excessive deficit rule of the SGP
unless a qualified majority of member states is opposed to the
Commission decision. 338 According to the current Article 126(6) of the

332. TSCG, supranote 326, art. 16.
333. See TSCG, supra note 326, art. 14(2). The incorporation of the content of the
Agreement on the Single Resolution Fund, which is scheduled to enter into force by
January 1, 2016, is instead supposed to occur within ten years, i.e., by January 1, 2026.
See Agreement SRF, supra note 328, art. 11.
334. See European Parliament Resolution of 2 February 2012 on the European Council
meeting of 30 January 2012, PARL. EUR. Doc. P7_TA(2012)0023 §9, available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+TA+P7-TA2012-0023+0+DOC+PDF+VO//EN (which "[i]nsists that the contracting parties fully
respect their commitment to integrate, within five years at the latest, the Treaty on
Stability, Coordination and Governance into the EU treaties and asks for the remaining
weaknesses of the Treaty of Lisbon to be tackled on this occasion.").
335. See Fabbrini, supra note 10, at 5.
336. But see TUORI & TUORI, supra note 320, at 109 (raising doubts on the possibility to
impose "through EU secondary regulation such an obligation to undertake legislative,
preferably constitutional, measures").
337. See TSCG, supra note 326, art. 7.
338. See Paul Craig, The Stability, Coordination and Governance Treaty: Principle,
Politicsand Pragmatism,37 EUR. L. REV. 231, 234, 244 (2012).
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TFEU, in fact, the opposite rule applies since a qualified majority vote
by the Council is necessary to endorse the decision of the Commission.
Hence, an amendment of the TFEU would probably be required. 339
Nevertheless, it is another part of the Fiscal Compact that would
certainly compel a treaty revision, if the member states are to obey their
obligation to bring back the content of that treaty in the TEU and
TFEU: this is Title V of the Fiscal Compact that provides a brand new
set of rules for the "Governance of the Euro Area." In particular, Article
12 of the Fiscal Compact institutionalizes the Euro Summit-i.e., the
meeting of the heads of state and governments of the Eurozone, jointly
with the Presidents of the Commission and the ECB-and creates the
3 40
post of President of the Euro Summit.
The Euro Summit, initially set up as an informal gathering in
October 2008 at the initiative of then French President Sarkozy, was
given a first structure in a statement adopted in October 2011 by the
heads of states and governments of the Eurozone member states. 341 This
statement advanced ten measures to improve the governance of the
Euro-area, including the decision to hold regular Euro Summit meetings
at least twice a year, establish a post of permanent Euro Summit
President, and coordinate the work of the Euro Summit with that of the
Eurogroup acting at a lower level in the composition of national
ministers of finance. The legal nature of this statement was not
clarified, and although part of its content was replicated in the
European Council conclusions of October 2011,342 it was uncertain
whether the statement could be interpreted as an international
agreement concluded by the Eurozone member states. The Fiscal
Compact, however, gave the Euro Summit a legal status-officializing
the format of the meetings and their composition. 343 Moreover, it
clarified the role of the President of the Euro Summit, which was
shaped tout court on the role of the President of European Council set by
Article 15 of the TEU.344 In March 2012, the heads of state and
government of the Eurozone member states decided to entrust the task

339. See Rainer Palmstorfer, The Reverse Majority Voting Under the 'Six Pack? A Bad
Turn for the Union?, 20 EUR. L.J. 186, 192, 193 (2014).
340. On the Euro Summit, see Christian Calliess, The Governance Framework of the
Eurozone and the Need for a Treaty Reform, in WHAT FORM OF GOVERNMENT FOR THE
EUROPEAN UNION AND THE EUROZONE? 37 (Federico Fabbrini et al. eds., 2015).
341. See generally Euro Summit Statement (Oct. 26, 2011), available at
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms dataldocs/pressdatalenec/125644.pdf.
342. See European Council Conclusions EUCO 52/1/11 of 23 October 2011, 5.
343. See TSCG, supranote 326, art. 12(1)-(2).
344. See suprap. 298.
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of Euro Summit President to Mr. Van Rompuy, 345 the then President of
the European Council. And in August 2014, when Mr. Tusk was elected
as second President of the European Council, he was also appointed as
President of the Euro Summit, 346 thus promoting a degree of
institutional connection-yet also of confusion-between the European
Council, in which all EU member states are involved, and the Euro
347
Summit, in which only a sub-group of states are represented.
Leaving aside the question of how the system of institutional
governance designed for the Eurozone can be "repatriated" within the
TEU, and reconciled with the broader institutional architecture that
concerns all the EU member states, 348 it seems undeniable that the
prospect of a treaty reform to reverse engineer the Euro Summit within
the TEU offers an attractive opportunity to reconsider the role of the
presidency as advocated in this article. 349 However, there remains a
follow up question: why should the member states' governments
subscribe to the idea of strengthening the role of the presidency of the
European Council? Whereas the Lisbon Treaty has institutionalized the
"Convention method" to amend the treaties, 350 ultimately, pursuant to
Article 48 of the TEU, a conference of representatives of the
governments of the member states shall be convened by the President of
the Council for the purpose of determining by common accord the
amendments to be made to the Treaties. The amendments shall enter
into force after being ratified by all the member states in accordance
with their respective constitutional requirements.

345. See Statement Euro Area Heads of State or Government, at 1 (Mar. 2, 2012),
available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms-data/docs/pressdata/enec/128521.pdf.
346. See Decision Heads of State or Government of the Contracting Parties to the TSCG,
at 1 (Aug. 30, 3014), available at http:/lwww.parlament.gv.atPAKT/EUXXV/EU/03/60/
EU_36040/imfname_10489339.pdf.
347. See Philippe De Schoutheete, The European Council After Van Rompuy, NOTRE
EUR. TRIB. VIEWPOINT, April 20, 2015, available at http://www.institutdelors.eu/media/
europeancouncil-deschoutheete-jdi-aprill5.pdfpdf=ok.
348. See generally Brigid Laffan, European Union and Eurozone: How to Co-exist?, in
GOVERNANCE FOR THE EUROZONE: INTEGRATION OR DISINTEGRATION? 173 (Franklin Allen

et al. eds., 2012) (examining how an "avante garde" Eurozone could develop if norms for
all EU member states are not established and followed).
349. See European Parliament Resolution of 20 November 2012 with recommendations
to the Commission on the report of the Presidents of the European Council, the European
Commission, the European Central Bank and the Eurogroup "Towards a Genuine
Economic and Monetary Union," PARL. EUR. DOC. P7_TA(2012)0430 § 6, available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP/[NONSGML+TA+P7-TA2012-0430+0+DOC+PDF+VO//EN (calling for a convention to amend the Treaties).
350. See generally Steve Peers, The Future of EU Treaty Amendments, 31 Y.B. EUR. L.
17 (2012) (explaining the process of revision of the EU Treaties).
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So why should the member states agree to revise the role of the
presidency of the European Council? I suggest that the proposal to
strengthen the presidency may be particularly attractive to many
member states for political reasons. However, I would also advise
introducing an institutional expedient to sweeten the change advocated
in this article and make it more agreeable for all of them.
From a political perspective, I suspect the idea to strengthen the
presidency may be attractive for the small, poor, and new EU member
states. As I have previously indicated, the intergovernmental
governance of the Euro-crisis during the last year has shattered the
expectations of the smaller member states that they could keep control
of the European Council and instead unleashed a dynamic of
domination by the larger states. 351 Otherwise, for the countries in dire
economic conditions in the southern European Union, the diminution of
power has been so significant that the idea of electing the President of
the European Council would be a way to regain status in EU decision
making.352 And for the countries in the eastern European Union, which
recently joined the Union and are not yet part of the Eurozone, the
strengthening of the President of the European Council would be a way
to ensure that they are not cut off from deliberation on the future of the
European Union 35 3 (not to mention, of course, the added value that a
stronger presidency could have for the eastern member states as far as
the protection of their interests in foreign affairs and security is
concerned). 354 However, I submit that the proposal to strengthen the
President of the European Council could also be advantageous for Italy
and France. Although both are large, rich, founding members of the
European Union, their influence on the EU agenda setting has greatly
diminished. 355 As seen above, despite efforts to counterbalance German
351. See Fabbrini, supranote 20, at 5.
352. See generally Lina Papadopoulou, Can ConstitutionalRules, Even if 'Golden, Tame
Greek Public Debt?, in THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF EUROPEAN BUDGETARY
CONSTRAINTS 223 (Federico Fabbrini et al. eds., 2014) (emphasizing restrictions of
sovereignty in Greece).
353. See e.g., Karolina Pomorska & Sophie Vanhoonacker, Polandin the Driving Seat: A
Mature Presidency in Turbulent Times, 50 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 76 (2012) (emphasizing
desire by Poland to be involved in EU decision making).
354. See generally Press Release, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Wales
Summit Declaration:Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participatingin the
Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales (Sept. 5, 2014) (emphasizing security
concerns in Eastern Europe).
355. See e.g., Adriana Cerretelli, La partita delle nomine che contano a Bruxelles, IL
SOLE 24 ORE (July 8, 2014), http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/notizie/2014-07-08/la-partita(reporting
nomine-che-contano-bruxelles-063621.shtml?uuid=AB4IzfYB&fromSearch
decreasing influence of Italian officials at EU level); Jean-Luc Gr6au, Peut-on enrayer le
diclin 6conomique franvais?, REVUE POLITIQUE ET PARLAMENTAIRE (Jan. 8, 2014),
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hegemony in the European Council, neither of them has effectively
succeeded in its plan. 356 Strengthening the presidency of the European
Council-which would be very much consistent with the domestic
tradition of the French form of government 35 7 -could therefore offer
them a preferable alternative to enduring another decade of German
domination.
In addition, the idea of a reformed presidency may actually work
well for the United Kingdom, if it remains in the Union. 358 This may
seem counterintuitive, since the United Kingdom has always been wary
and protective of its
of European Union over-empowerment
constitutional tradition.3 59 Yet, the idea is not entirely foreign to U.K.
preferences, since at the time of the Constitutional Convention the U.K.
government had expressed its support for a strengthened presidency of
the European Council. 360 Moreover, as of now, the United Kingdom has
had major difficulties in finding an EU institutional forum through
which to channel its concerns. The role of the U.K. government in the
European Council is weak, and the capacity of U.K. voters to influence
through their ballot for the European Parliament the composition and
the agenda of the Commission is negligible. 361 On the contrary, as I have
suggested above, the presidency may serve as a brake against
supranational encroachments over national prerogative. 362 Because an
elected President of the European Council could speak for the entire
European Union, and could make a legitimate claim to protect the
federal division of competence, the interests of the United Kingdom
could be better secured through this new institutional arrangement

(discussing
http://www.revuepolitique.fr/peut-enrayer-le-declin-economique-francais/
French economic decline).
356. See supra pp. 282-83.
357. See Magnette, supra note 150, at 1067; Duverger, supra note 187.
358. See European Union (Referendum) Bill, 2012-13, H.C. [11] cl.1 (U.K.) (stating that
a referendum on the U.K.'s membership within the EU will be held before 31 December
2017).
359. See generally European Union Act, 2011, c. 12 (U.K.) (placing restrictions on
treaties relating to the EU); Paul Craig, The European Union Act 2011: Locks, Limits and
Legality, 28 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1881 (2011) (discussing the 'locks" the U.K. has
imposed on its ability to approve EU documents and decisions).
360. CRAIG, supra note 151, at 83 (reporting a January 2003 proposal by the U.K.
government advanced during the Constitutional Convention in favor of strengthening the
presidency of the European Council).
361. See Toby Helm, Humiliating Defeat for David Cameron Pushes Britain Towards
EU Exit, THE GUARDIAN (June 28, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun28/
(reporting increasing isolation of the U.K.
cameron-eu-juncker-defeat-britain-exit
government in the European Council).
362. See supra pp. 307-08.
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rather than the current one. 363 Note also that, following the mechanism
of election I articulated above, the United Kingdom would be entitled to
102 "electoral votes" for the choice of the President-and no presidential
candidate could afford to disregard the concerns of a constituency that
counts for 20 percent of the votes needed to win one-half of the total
1,103 electoral votes.
This of course leaves out Germany. As the reluctant hegemon of the
European Union, 364 and the state that currently sets the tone of the EU
policy agenda, Germany would have the most to lose from a proposal to
strengthen the presidency of the European Council. Nevertheless,
because of its history, Germany also has very much to lose from fueling
the popular view that it has, once again, come to dominate the
continent. 365 As such, the burning of a German flag by Greek youngsters
in Syntagma Square, Athens, 366 as well as the proposal by a former
President of the European Commission to set up an alliance between
France, Italy, and Spain against Germany, 367 should be cause for
concerns in Germany. Hence, my proposal: Germany should take a step
back, trade its short-term dominant position for the long-term interest
in protecting the sustainability of the Union and accept the plan to
directly elect the President of the European Council. With 125 "electoral
votes" out of a total of 1,103, Germany would still be the leading battle
state for any presidential candidate that wants to win election. At the
same time, the other member states must compensate Germany with a
payback: accommodating repeated and legitimate German concerns, 368
they must accept the writing into the EU treaties of a prohibition to
mutualize the debts of the Eurozone member states. The proposals to
adopt Euro-bonds or a redemption fund, which are periodically revived
in the debate, 369 are ill conceived because they would ask Germany to
363. See generally FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, REVIEW OF THE BALANCE OF
COMPETENCES (2012), available at https://www.gov.uk/review-of-the-balance-of-competences

(considering effect of EU competences on U.K. policy).
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2013, at 52, 52-53 (highlighting Germany's "second chance" after WWII and its reluctance
to help countries any more than is absolutely necessary).
366. See Wearden, supra note 14.
367. See Damilano, supra note 123.
368. Cf. Merkel Vows 'No Euro Bonds as Long as I Live, DER SPIEGEL ONLINE (June 27,
2012, 9:25 AM), http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/chancellor-merkel-vows-noeuro-bonds-as-long-as-she-lives-a-841163.html (reporting strenuous opposition by German
Chancellor Angela Merkel against the proposal to create Euro-bonds).
369. Compare Jean-Claude Juncker & Giulio Tremonti, E-Bonds Would End the Crisis,
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pay for the debts of the other member states.370 This is unfair and
unprecedented, since in no federal system worldwide are debts of one
unit horizontally paid by the treasury of another unit.371 Ruling out this
possibility in the EU treaties would assuage Germany and make it
possibly more interested in signing off for a reformed EU presidency.
It goes without saying that what I am suggesting is a great
compromise, analogous to the one struck by the United States at the
Philadelphia Constitutional Convention: 372 Every EU member state
gives up something, yet everyone gains something in return, and the
Union is better off. Of course, path dependency constitutes a strong
obstacle against changing the functioning of the European Council-and
it is unlikely that the heads of state and government would be willing to
renounce playing a role in EU policy making. 373 But this claim could be
dealt with by envisaging a new role for the congress of states' presidents
and prime ministers-e.g., as by transforming the European Council as
the real upper legislative house of the European Union, absorbing the
legislative functions of the Council. In my view, the operation of the
European Council as a collective executive has been unsatisfactory.
However, the European Council could perhaps fulfill an important role
as a kind of EU Senate. Strengthening the role of the President of the
European Council as the real EU executive would then become part of a
broader package of reforms-and its success would be linked to a more
comprehensive restructuring of the EU institutional architecture based
374
on a healthy constitutional compromise.
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CONCLUSION

The European economy is fragile. Speaking at the Euro Summit
meeting of October 2014, ECB President Mario Draghi stated that
growth in the Eurozone will remain flat if not outright negative in 2014
and 2015, inflation is at an all-time low, while unemployment is
unacceptably high-with an average of 11.5 percent of the total
workforce without a job and almost 24 percent of young people out of the
labor market. 375 Speaking before the European Parliament in March
2015, after the ECB inaugurated a monetary policy of quantitative
easing, 376 the ECB President sounded slightly more hopeful on the
prospects of growth and inflation, but he underlined the still dramatic
conditions of the labour market. 377 This is itself a cause for concern. Yet,
as this article has suggested, the specific economic condition of the
European Union and the resilience of austerity is just the surface of a
structural constitutional problem, which is a reason for even greater
concern. Austerity has prevailed in the EU responses to the crisis
because of the growing imbalance between the EU member states, with
Germany playing a central position in the EU decision-making process
and promoting its policy preferences throughout the European Union.
And this is the result of institutional developments in the EU system of
government-finding their roots in the Maastricht Treaty but becoming
fully visible during the Euro-crisis-which have seen the European
Council (the body congressing the heads of states and governments of
the EU member states) rise to the center of EU politics and set the
agenda of the European Union as far as economic policy is concerned.
Nevertheless, in an intergovernmental forum such as the European
Council, the traditional equilibrium between the member states has
been upset, opening the door to a dynamic of interstate domination.
Austerity is the evidence of this, but the problem runs deeper.
Regardless of whether one is in favor of or against the policy of
austerity, an institutional regime in which some member states can
dominate the policy-making process and impose their preferences over
the others strikes at the heart of the antihegemonic nature of the EU
integration project. A Union of states and citizens like the European
375. Mario Draghi, President of the ECB, "Economic Situation in the Euro Area",
Presentation at the Euro Summit, (Oct. 24, 2014), available at http://www.ecb.europa.eul
press/key/date/2014/html/sp141024_l.en.html.
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Purchase Programme (Jan. 22, 2015), available at https://www.ecb.europa.eulpress/pr/
date/2015/html pr150122_l.en.html.
377. Mario Draghi, President of the ECB, Hearing at the European Parliament's
Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee, Introductory Remarks and Q&A (Mar. 23,
2015), availableat https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2015/html/spl5O323_1.en.html.
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Union can only be sustained if all its constitutive parts feel they have a
way to influence the decisions that affect them. As the economic
responses to the Euro-crisis have made clear, however, austerity has
remained resilient in the European Union notwithstanding the
increasing protest against, and opposition to, it in many EU member
states, because this policy met the approval of the largest state of the
European Union and its economic powerhouse: Germany. In this
situation, it is not surprising that citizens in many member states have
regarded the economic measures mandated by the European Union as
illegitimate, and have increasingly voiced their disagreement by casting
their ballots for extreme, antisystem parties, openly advocating leaving
the Eurozone. When the possibility of voice is limited, exit becomes a
378
viable option.
To address this critical state of affairs, this article has advanced the
proposal to introduce a targeted institutional reform in the European
Union: strengthening the role of the President of the European Council,
so as to make it the President of the Union as a whole, along the
constitutional logic of separation of powers. If the European Council
increasingly becomes the center of EU politics, then, this article
proposed that its presidency ought to be endowed with greater powers
and legitimacy. Reforming the presidency of the European Council, by
increasing its capacity to set the EU agenda (beyond the preferences of a
few EU member states) and making it accountable directly to EU
citizens (rather than just to the EU heads of states and government)
would be instrumental not only to reestablishing a healthy balance
between the EU member states, but also to creating a genuine forum for
democratic competition on the agenda of the European Union. As I
claimed, compared to other options of institutional reform, especially
the initiative to boost the politicization of the President of the European
Commission along a fusion-of-powers logic, the proposal to strengthen
the President of the European Council along a separation-of-powers
logic, is better fitting the nature of the European Union as an
asymmetrical union of states and citizens.
To support this argument, this article sought to first offer a
(certainly incomplete) explanation of what the proposal to strengthen
the presidency of the European Council would entail, and then
discussed from a comparative constitutional perspective a number of
pressing challenges that accompany this proposal for institutional
reform.

378. See generally ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, LOYALTY:
DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS AND STATES (1970).
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First, I considered how a strengthened presidency of the European
Council could handle the representation deficit that currently
characterizes the EU executive branch and outlined the specific powers
that should be attributed to the President. Here I emphasized the
advantages that a reformed presidency would produce in terms of
equality between the states, unity of the Union, and protection of the
federal compact, and recommended that the President be entrusted with
the power to shape the Commissioners, to veto EU legislation, butcrucially-not to dissolve the European Parliament. Second, I focused
on the modes of election and suggested a possible mechanism to elect
the President of the European Council that takes into account the
profound asymmetry in population between the EU member states.
Here, I discarded the option for an EU-wide popular election and rather
proposed that the President be voted on by EU citizens in state
constituencies-each of which should be awarded a number of "electoral
votes" equal to the number of seats that state has in the European
Parliament and the number of votes it weights in the Council-through
a majority (rather than plurality) system, with a runoff between the two
candidates that received the most votes. Third, I discussed the chances
that the proposal outlined above could be taken seriously in the debate
about EMU reform and cautiously suggested that a window of
opportunity may actually exist. Given the obligation for the EU member
states to incorporate the content of the Fiscal Compact within the EU
treaties, the idea to strengthen the presidency may be put on the table
as an advantageous option for a majority of EU member states, while
sweeteners and institutional paybacks ought to be devised to convince
the other states, notably Germany, to sign off to the deal.
Ultimately, many challenges cloud the possibility for the European
Union to change its constitutional architecture in the direction of
strengthening the presidency of the European Council. However,
beginning a discussion about the potentials of such an institutional
reform seems to be a worthwhile effort. Beyond the policy of austerity,
efforts should be made to reform the EU system of governance so that it
is no longer subject to dynamics of interstate domination. Strengthening
the role of the President of the European Council along the logic of
separation of powers can be the most suitable constitutional step to
restore an institutional balance and to create a democratic forum for an
open and genuine contestation on the agenda of the European Union.

